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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How are Electric Utilities Responding to the Impact of Renewables? 
 Exploring an Integrative Approach to Ambidextrous Business Behavior 
 
 
By 
 
 
Robert Thomas Casey, Jr. 
 
April 20, 2015 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Karen Loch 
 
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business 
 
 
 In the U.S., clean energy goals and the move towards a clean energy economy are 
causing the electric power sector to add emerging and innovative renewable energy resources 
into their generation mix. Electric utilities (EU) face a monumental challenge to create, deliver, 
and capture value from emerging and disruptive technologies. This study seeks to address the 
impact of solar photovoltaics on the EU market by investigating the role of business model 
changes within the domain of urban and rural U.S. electric utility organizations. By integrating 
the evolving EU business model with the Competing Values Framework (CVF), a new lens is 
created to assess the changing and evolving business behavior within the EU industry. 
Furthermore, a predictive and prescriptive tool emerges associated with organizational 
ambidexterity (OA). Finally, four lessons are presented that will help EU leaders become more 
anticipatory, adaptable, and responsive in this changing renewable environment. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing that examined the 
state of technological innovation related to the electric industry. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-
Alaska), chairman of the committee, stated that “a combination of market forces, technological 
innovation, and policy directives at both the federal and the state levels could well result in an 
unprecedented transformation of the electricity sector" (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, March 2015). This transformation is not just a U.S. phenomenon but across 
the globe the electric power sector has added emerging and innovative renewable energy 
resources into their electric power generation mix to fight climate change and resource depletion. 
Electric utilities (EU) in the U.S. are now faced with a challenge of negotiating, managing, and 
responding to emerging and disruptive renewable technologies. 
 
The U.S. electric power industry has three types of EU service providers: 1) investor-owned 
utilities, 2) electric cooperatives, and 3) municipal electric utilities. Since investor-owned electric 
utilities (IOU) serve more than two-thirds of the urban U.S. population and electric cooperatives 
(Co-op) serve about three quarters of the U.S. landmass they were included in this study. IOUs 
and Co-ops have significant structural and operational differences. An IOU is a privately-owned 
electric utility whose stock is publicly traded, is cost-of-service regulated by the state and is 
authorized to achieve an allowed rate-of-return. A Co-op is a private, not-for-profit business 
governed by their consumers and generally exempt from Federal income tax laws. Federal 
guidelines require that all Co-ops have democratic governance and operate at cost. Consumers 
elect local boards that oversee the Co-op which must return revenue above what is needed for 
operation to the consumer. A Co-op generates, transmits, and/or distributes supplies of electric 
energy to a specified area not being serviced by another utility. Most electric cooperatives were 
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initially financed by the Rural Utilities Service and typically serve rural America (U.S. EIA, 
2014). Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of both types of EUs. 
Table 1 IOU and Co-op Characteristics 
Investor-owned Electric Utilities (IOU) Electric Cooperatives (Co-op) 
1. Fiduciary obligation to earn as large a 
margin as possible. 
1. Non-profit institutions run by the 
customers that the Co-op region serves. 
2. Take advantage of accelerated depreciation 
and investment tax credits. 
2. Exempt from state regulations and Federal 
income tax. 
3. Serve more than two-thirds of the US 
population. 
3. Federal and regional governments 
contribute management expertise, financial 
support, and grants to promote agriculture 
and to allow service to rural America. 
4. Subject to different regulations than 
publicly-owned utilities and Co-ops. 
4. Acquisition of actual energy and ancillary 
services are performed to reduce cost. 
5. Average of 2,200 employees and 315,000 
consumers per IOU. 
5. Average of 57 employees and 10,000 
consumers per Co-op. Co-ops cover three 
quarters of U.S. landmass. 
 
IOUs and Co-ops have been slow to change in the last 35 years. However, IOUs and Co-ops 
have recently witnessed an ever-growing and continuous pressure to change due to the disruptive 
technology of solar energy. A 2013 report from the Edison Electric Institute shows the degree of 
impact of these disruptive forces and proposes a possible electric utility death spiral due to 
decreases in solar PV cost, increases in regulatory environment pressure, and changes in 
customer behavior due to government incentive programs (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Electric Utility Disruptive Innovation (Solar 
 
As technological and economic changes challenge and transform the 
changes (or “disruptive challenges”) arise due to a convergence of factors
“…falling costs of distributed 
(DER); increasing customer, regulatory
encourage selected technologies;
growth trends; and rising electricity prices in certain areas of the country
 
Decreases in sales growth create a downward 
decrease in revenue causes EUs to raise rates 
to consider the further implementation of alternative t
centralized EU business model is 
technologies and the related customer behavioral changes that reduce 
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solar generation and other distributed energy 
, ...government environmental programs to
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to cover fixed costs, thereby prompting customers 
echnologies. Therefore, the 
very likely to come from these new solar photovoltaic 
electrical load. (
 
 
, these 
resources 
 
.” (EEI, 2013) 
. This 
threat to the 
EEI, 2013) 
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The purpose of this study is to consider the effects of solar photovoltaics on the EU market. 
Specifically, it investigates the role of EU business model changes within the domain of IOU 
(urban) and Co-op (rural) U.S. electric utility organizations. By using an integrative approach 
with Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff, and Thakor’s (2006) Competing Values Framework (CVF) and 
Richter’s (2011) EU business model, an assessment can be made to understand how IOUs and 
Co-ops have changed between 2009 and 2014. Through this assessment, a predictive and 
prescriptive tool emerges that enables EU leaders to interpret to what extent they have shown 
ambidextrous behaviors to embrace solar energy and how they can become more anticipatory, 
adaptable, and responsive to a shifting environment. 
 
The two research questions to be addressed in this study are: 1) How have EUs responded to a 
shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology? and 2) What 
are the discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-
owned (urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar 
technology? 
I.1 Electric Utility Background 
To better grasp and respond to what is happening in their environments, IOUs and Co-ops use an 
integrated resource planning (IRP) process which evaluates the costs and benefits of both 
demand-side and supply-side resources to develop the least total-cost mix of electric utility 
resource options over a twenty-year period (U.S. Department of Energy). 
The Tri-State Generation and Transmission Co-op in Colorado, which serves 18 distribution Co-
ops with generation and transmission resources, says the IRP has become a formal process 
prescribed by law in some states as a result of some provisions of the Clean Air Act amendments 
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of 1992 (Tri-State IRP, 2010). This process is a critical tool for balancing the ability to see new 
opportunities while maintaining a focus on current operating advantages. An IRP is typically 
submitted every three years by the EU to the state’s Public Service Commission (PSC) for 
approval (GPC IRP, 2013). The IRP is like organizational radar, allowing decision-makers to 
develop an early warning system for potentially devastating disruptive technologies, third-party 
competitor developments, and other electric utility industry shifts. 
 
Some state IRP rules have remained unchanged since they were first implemented; other states 
have amended, repealed, and in some cases reinstated their IRP rules. Rules that have been 
amended often reflect current concerns in the electric industry such as fuel costs and volatility, 
the effects of power generation on air and water, issues of national security, electricity market 
conditions, and climate change, as well as individual state concerns. At Georgia Power 
Company, the 2013 IRP results were formulated by using multiple scenario planning cases which 
evaluated the impacts of three different fuel price views and three different carbon/renewable 
generation views (GPC IRP, 2013). Co-ops typically propose a 15 year resource planning 
process that is revised every 5 years.  Co-ops are not regulated by the state PSC and therefore are 
not required to submit a long-term resource plan for approval. 
Both the IOU and Co-op are being impacted by the emergence of solar PV which has been 
triggered primarily by two pieces of federal legislation. The first piece of legislation, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), is an economic stimulus package 
enacted by the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and signed into law on February 
17, 2009, by President Barack Obama (Pub. L. 111–5). The ARRA (Figure 2) is an $800 billion 
economic stimulus package aimed at job creation and the promotion of investment and consumer 
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spending. This act allocated $4.3B in tax credits to homeowners for energy efficiency 
improvements (2009 - 2010 extended to 2016), $21.5B for energy infrastructure, and $27.2B for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy research and investment. The second piece of 
legislation, under the Clean Air Act (CAA), is President Obama’s Climate Action Plan (CAP) 
which includes two sections: Section 111(d) commonly called the Clean Power Plan (CPP) and 
Section 111(b) commonly called the Carbon Pollution Standards (CPS). How did these two 
pieces of legislation trigger the growth of solar energy use and technology? 
 
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which encourages use of renewables and is supported 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has been introduced in three stages. The 
plan first proposed cutting carbon pollution from new and existing power plants by creating 
targets for fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions and mandated that CO2 emitted from fossil-fuel 
based generation must be reduced by 30 percent by 2030 as compared to 2005 levels. Current 
proposals include a specific emission reduction target for year 2030 for each state with a one 
year deadline for an implementation plan to meet the targets. The EPA CAA Fact Sheet (U.S. 
EPA) shows these milestones: 
1. January 2013, EPA proposed standards to limit carbon pollution from new power plants. 
2. June 2014, EPA proposed the CPP to limit carbon pollution from existing power plants. 
3. June 2015, EPA plans to propose a federal plan to meet CPP goals for comment. 
4. June 2016, proposed due date for states to submit compliance plans to EPA. 
5. June 2020, proposed beginning of the CPP compliance period. 
 
The CAA proposes to let states meet emission targets for power plants through plant upgrades, 
by switching from coal to natural gas, and by improving energy efficiency or promoting 
renewable energy. Many industry groups are insisting that the EPA limit itself to more modest 
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efficiency gains that could be made in power plants alone lest energy rates increase dramatically 
across the nation. According to the ruling, if a state does not develop an effective implementation 
plan, the EPA can impose a federal plan (U.S. EPA, 2015). 
Due to these regulatory changes, the emergence of solar PV energy is becoming a disruptive 
force in the EU utility-side grid business model landscape. 
 
Figure 2 Evolution of the Electric Utility Industry Regulatory Environment 
 
I.2 Disruptive Innovations 
Disruptive technological innovations disturb the established trajectory of performance 
improvement and often destroy the value of existing competencies (Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). A major characteristic of disruptive technologies is that they are rarely directly employed 
1920 1930 1940 1990 20121950 1960 1970 1980 20142000 2010
1933: FDR New Deal era regulatory 
(PUHCA) intervention into the electric 
industry led to four service providers:
1) Investor-owned utilities
2) Publicly owned utilities
3) Cooperative utilities
4) Federal electric utilities (TVA)
1973: (OPEC oil embargo) - Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Introduced 
competition and encouraged efficient use of 
fossil fuels by allowing non-utility generators to 
enter the wholesale power market 
(cogenerators; and independent power 
producers (IPPs), which use renewable resources 
as their primary energy source.
1995: (Bush's Energy Policy Act)
Opened access to transmission networks to 
non-utility generators. EPACT led states which 
had historically high electricity prices to 
investigate whether competitive deregulated 
markets would benefit their consumers. 
California and Rhode Island passed 
deregulation legislation, giving the consumer 
the right to choose his electricity supplier.
1947 to 1973: Annual growth rate 
at 8% per year and little change in 
the industry structure.
2005: (Energy Policy Act)
Offers tax benefits to 
individuals who increase energy 
efficiency in existing homes, 
buy or lease hybrid/alternative 
vehicles. Required all public 
utilities to offer net metering on 
request.
2009: (American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act):  A $800 billion economic stimulus 
package aimed at job creation and the 
promotion of investment and consumer 
spending. Included $4.3b in tax credits to 
homeowners for energy efficiency 
improvements in 2009-2010, $21.5b for 
energy infrastructure, $27.2b for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy research and 
investment, etc.
2014: EPA rule to 
reduce the amount 
of carbon dioxide 
emitted from 
fossil-fuel based 
generation by 30 
percent by 2030 
compared to 2005 
levels. The rule sets 
emission reduction 
goals for each state 
and gives states 
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choose how to 
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in established markets, but instead change the architecture of the market in the medium and long 
term (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
 
The theory of disruptive technological change provides insight into the impact of different 
renewable energy technologies for electric utilities: 
1) Disruptive technologies generally “create entirely new markets through the introduction 
of a new kind of product or service” (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000, p.72). 
2) The concept of “architectural” (Henderson & Clark, 1990) or “integrative” (O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004) innovations recognize the fact that many innovations do not require 
breakthrough technology to have major disruptive impacts on markets. These 
architectural innovations essentially take core technologies and ideas that already exist 
and combine them in new and novel ways to achieve an innovation that is greater than 
the proverbial sum of its parts (Henderson & Clark, 1990; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
 
This author believes that distributed solar energy is both an architectural innovation and a new 
market technology based upon the industry reaction to the disruptive impact on the vertically 
integrated EU business model. Solar panel architecture (customer-side designs) allows electric 
energy to be produced and then used where the consumer load is located reducing the need for 
the electric grid and lowering the requirements for large EU resources. It can also be argued that 
third-party customer-side solar leasing systems meet the criterion of creating “new markets” as 
witnessed by the emergence of numerous companies offering leasing options to homeowners. 
Finally, the emergence of new products and services that support these designs also constitute a 
new market.  
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theory elaboration entails the application of new concepts borrowed from other theoretical 
perspectives to explain the focal phenomena (Braxton et al., 1997; Thornberry, 1989). This 
qualitative research uses theory elaboration to draw on, extend, and organize important ideas 
from EU Business Model changes and OA behaviors in response to the challenges introduced by 
the emergence of solar PV. The goals of this study are 1) to develop an integrative approach to 
assess EU business model changes to understand how IOUs and Co-ops have changed between 
2009 and 2014 and 2) to develop a predictive and prescriptive tool that allows EU leaders to 
interpret to what extent they have shown ambidextrous behaviors in embracing solar energy and 
to determine how they can become more anticipatory, adaptable, and responsive in a shifting 
environment.  
 
II.1 EU Business Model 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2009: 14) explain a business model as “the rationale of how an 
organization creates, delivers, and captures value”. A business model also functions as a valuable 
tool for analysis and management in engaged scholarship (Zott & Amit, 2008) and as an 
organizational tool to build comprehensive groupings to help understand business phenomena 
(Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). As an organizational decision making tool, the business model 
concept also helps executives and managers develop techniques to plan, design, construct, 
operate, change, and interpret their business (Wirtz et al., 2010). Richter (2011) states that many 
definitions of an EU business model encompass four basic elements: the value proposition, the 
customer interface, the infrastructure, and the revenue model. Richter’s (2011) EU business 
model is used in this study as a structural template to describe the organizational composition 
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(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002) and to examine, compare, and contrast EU companies in a 
structured manner. 
 
The Richter (2011) EU model contains two “sides”: the utility-side and the customer-side, which 
are analyzed throughout this study. A utility-side solar array encompasses a large scale project 
with capacity between two and a few hundred megawatts. For example, a typical 30 megawatt 
solar array requires approximately 200 acres of property and a connection to the transmission 
grid for operation. The value to the EU is bulk generation of electricity; electricity is fed into the 
grid and delivered to the customer in the traditional manner of coal, gas, and nuclear power 
plants. Just as Teece (2010) describes, the utility-side generation business model describes how 
EU organizations deliver value to customers and investors at a reduced cost, attracting 
consumers to pay for that lower cost value, and then transforming the revenue into a profit or 
service.  
 
The second model is the customer-side distributed solar photovoltaics (PV) generation (roof-top) 
installation. A roof-top installation is typically attached to a residential or commercial facility 
close to the point of consumption. A building can be completely supplied with electricity to the 
point that it is “net-metered”. Net-metering (NEM) allows electricity customers who wish to 
supply their own electricity from on-site generation to pay only for the net energy they obtain 
from the utility. PV systems can at times export excess power to the grid which is then credited 
to the consumer’s bill. The possible value of solar PV to the EU would be providing a full 
service package that includes financial solar panel leasing and maintenance, energy consulting 
services, and net-metering. Richter (2013) states that EUs in Germany believe distributed solar 
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PV generation has no value chain proposition and therefore have not ventured into this new 
market. In this U. S. study, the customer-side renewable energy business model, depicted in 
Figure 3, is being explored and accepted as a model which both IOUs and Co-ops have adopted 
between 2009 and 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Richter (2011) EU Renewable Energy Business Models 
 
Fundamentally EU business models are changing due to decreases in solar PV cost, increases in 
regulatory environment pressure, and changes in customer behavior due to government incentive 
programs. Is it possible that the renewable energy issues that impact the EU organization will be 
debated and resolved in an EU model regulatory component? For the purpose of this study, the 
business model refers to the Richter (2011) renewable energy nomenclature with a fifth business 
model component of “regulatory” added by the author because the U.S. the electric utility 
industry is regulated at all government levels: federal, state, and municipal. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the Richter (2011) Business Model with the added regulatory component. 
 
Generation Transmission Distribution Retail Consumption
Customer-Side 
Renewable 
Energy Business 
Model 
Utility-Side 
Renewable 
Energy Business 
Model 
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Table 2 EU Business Model Components 
Component Utility-Side Business Model 
Customer-Side 
Business Model 
Value Proposition - is the bundle of 
products and services that creates 
value for the customer and allows the 
company to earn revenues. 
Bulk generation of electricity 
fed into the grid 
Customized solutions and 
energy related services 
Customer Interface - comprises the 
overall interaction with the customer. 
It consists of customer relationship, 
customer segments, and distribution 
channels.  
Electricity as commodity and 
customer pays per unit 
Customer is involved in energy 
generation by hosting the 
generation system and sharing 
benefits with the utility. Long-
term customer relationship. 
Infrastructure - describes the 
architecture of the company's value 
creation. It includes assets, know 
how, and partnerships.  
Small number of large scale 
assets and centralized 
generation 
Large number of small scale 
assets and generation close to 
the point of consumption 
Revenue - represents the relationship 
between costs to produce the value 
proposition and the revenues that are 
generated by offering the value 
proposition the customers.  
Revenues through feed-in of 
electricity. Economies of 
scale from large projects and 
project portfolio. 
Revenue from direct use, feed-
in and/or from services. High 
transaction costs. 
Added:     
Regulatory - Federal and State 
mandates and credits 
Environmental mandates 
incentivizing third-party solar 
PV ownership. Variable 
energy resources reduce grid 
reliability. 
Net metering and solar garden 
legislation promotes distributed 
generation. EU experiences lost 
revenue and cross-subsidy 
issues. 
 
Solar PV technology has the potential to affect components of the EU Business Model. The 
presence of a third-party entity owning a utility-side or customer-side solar system effects the 
typical IOU and Co-op business model with opposing interests creating a context in which the 
interaction between EU leaders and stakeholders (consumers and policymakers) are important to 
recognize (Elsbach, 1994). The business model for an IOU is a guaranteed return-on-investment 
(ROI) as established by a state regulatory agency, the PSC. The IOU can recover its cost through 
rate increases or exercising fixed cost infrastructure tariffs to keep the investor interests in check. 
The business model for a Co-op is very different from a customer service context. Its Board of 
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Directors (BOD) is typically comprised of business owners within the Co-op’s service territory 
and rate increases are scrutinized by the Co-op’s customers, not a state agency. What is common 
between an IOU and a Co-op is that solar PV may erode revenue through its use at the industrial, 
commercial, and residential levels. 
 
Although IOUs and Co-ops are both negatively affected by the emergence of solar PV where 
revenue is concerned, differences also exist. IOUs and Co-ops often have divergent interests (i.e. 
investor-owned vs. customer-owned and regulated vs. unregulated) resulting in customer tension 
stemming from conflicts between rural versus urban customer service goals. Moreover, the 
relatively small size of Co-ops makes leaders and key stakeholders easily identifiable, whereas 
IOUs are typically very large and management heavy insulating the needs of the customer from 
business drivers. 
 
To exacerbate the solar PV issue, policymakers have encouraged disruptive competing solar 
energy through various subsidy programs such as tax incentives, renewable portfolio standards, 
and net-metering, where the pricing structure of utility services allows customers to engage in 
the use of new technologies consequently shifting costs and lost revenues to remaining non-
participating customers (EEI, 2013). Thus, the ongoing growth of solar energy will continue to 
be a disruptive negative force in the EU industry. The potential impact of solar PV on the EU 
industry, their customers, and regulatory agencies is shown in Figure 4 and Table 3. As shown, 
the negative impact on the EU industry reveals an unclear value proposition for the development 
of an economically sustainable revenue model. Thus, EUs may be far from reaching 
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organizational ambidexterity in the field of renewable energy. 
 
 
Figure 4 Electric Utility Solar PV Disruptive Model 
 
 
Table 3 Electric Utility Solar PV Disruptive Character 
 
IOU Co-op 
Utility-Side 
• EPA (CPP) 
• VER ($) 
• IOU Guaranteed Cost 
Recovery 
• Increased Rates  
• EPA (CPP) 
• VER ($) 
• Third-party ownership 
• Increased Rates 
Customer-
Side 
Urban America 
• Elitist Enterprise 
• Regulatory Market 
Dependent 
• Non-solar Cost-sharing 
Rural America 
• Less Market 
• Regulatory Market 
Dependent 
• Non-solar Cost-sharing 
 
- 
Electric 
Utility 
Renewables 
Wind 
 
 Solar 
PV 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
Regulatory 
Model 
Customer 
Behavior 
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 Party) 
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II.2 Organizational Ambidexterity 
Organizational ambidexterity (OA) is the ability to pursue two different objectives 
simultaneously (Porter, 1980). OA is a mental balancing act for managers of maintaining the 
current core business while developing radically new products and services for the future of the 
organization (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; March, 1991). Organization scientists have adopted 
the human trait of ambidexterity (an ability to use both hands with equal skill) as a metaphor to 
describe competent organizations. Thus, the theory of organizational ambidexterity suggests that 
organizations are successful in the long term when they are able to exploit their existing 
capabilities while developing new exploratory competencies (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). 
 
Companies tend to divide their attention and resources between exploration and exploitation, 
which are seen in the literature as two broad types of qualitatively distinct learning and 
knowledge processes (Floyd & Lane, 2000; March, 1991). Exploration implies organizational 
behavior characterized by variance-increasing activities including search, discovery, 
experimentation, risk-taking and innovation, whereas exploitation is characterized by variance-
decreasing activities including disciplined problem solving, refinement, implementation, 
efficiency, production and selection (Cheng & Van de Ven,1996; March,1991). Organizations 
look to expand their capacities to successfully confront intensifying paradoxes and effectively 
manage contradictory challenges to ensure their viability and competitiveness in an increasingly 
turbulent environment in which multiple and inconsistent contextual demands can emerge (Smith 
& Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). The management of these organizational 
paradoxes, contradictions, and conflicts (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989) is crucial in keeping an 
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organization viable and enabling it to adapt and survive in the face of environmental 
disturbances. 
 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) distinguish between two forms of organizational ambidexterity - 
structural ambidexterity and contextual ambidexterity. Researchers have determined that 
structural ambidexterity (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) and contextual ambidexterity (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004) are important for the growth of the ambidextrous organization. 
 
Structural ambidexterity is the structural separation and coordination of entities into those 
focused on exploration and those focused on exploitation, often with different performance 
metrics where it involves splitting into different organizational units (Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Splitting into different organizational units is one structural ambidexterity process that 
copes with the dilemma of balancing exploration and exploitation. O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) 
examined several different structural responses to disruptive change and determined that 
separating the organization responsible for dealing with a disruptive change from the existing 
business with coordination at the senior executive level is the organizational template most 
closely associated with structural ambidexterity. The second structural ambidexterity process that 
some organizations use is focused on the organizational characteristics and competencies 
required to sense new opportunities and threats, seize upon them, and then reconfigure the 
organization to take advantage of the opportunities or counter the threats (O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2004). The theoretical framing describes the three key capabilities in the structural ambidexterity 
literature as the “tripartite taxonomy” of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring (Teece, 2007, 2010). 
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Contextual ambidexterity is the ability for individuals within the organization to balance the 
needs for alignment and adaptability (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) where it involves creating an 
organizational context and responding to the organizational stimuli that inspire, guide, and 
reward people to act in a certain way (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1997). Contextual ambidexterity 
allows exploitation and exploration behaviors to grow, exist, and emerge in the same 
organizational unit. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) have shown that the four established 
characteristics of organizational context, as described by Ghoshal & Bartlett (1994), namely 
discipline, stretch, support, and trust, are good indicators of contextual ambidexterity (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004). In addition to these four organizational characteristics, Birkinshaw and 
Gibson (2004) also identified four individual behaviors associated with contextual ambidexterity 
(Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004, p. 49) which are initiative, cooperation, communication, and 
multitasking. 
 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) explain that contextual ambidexterity is the collective orientation 
of the employees toward the simultaneous pursuit of alignment and adaptability. The key to 
contextual ambidexterity is empowering employees to make day-to-day decisions on how to 
balance exploration and exploitation, rather than having those decisions come from senior 
management. To do so, it is necessary for senior management to create an organizational context 
that provides support for individual employee decision-making roles and more generalist 
positions (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004). 
 
Specifically for this study, questions remain concerning the drivers for determining the EU 
organizational ambidexterity type to pursue for the different solar PV dynamics. Primarily, this 
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study seeks to understand EU organizational solar PV issues that give rise to paradoxes and 
concessions to enhance long-term competitiveness (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  
 
The two research questions to be addressed in this study are: 1) How have EUs responded to a 
shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology? 
 
Another expectation is to determine to what extent IOUs and Co-ops have shown ambidextrous 
behaviors during this time period. Also, an investor-owned utility (IOU) may have a different 
strategy of how to structure its business model compared to an electric cooperative (Co-op) 
because the IOU serves primarily urban customers and the Co-op serves rural customers. This 
potential difference leads to the second research question: 2) What are the discernable business 
model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and electric 
cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology? 
 
II.3 Sensemaking 
To examine the EU business model changes through a problem-solving process, the framework 
of this study begins with a critical organizational activity - “sensemaking” (Weick, 1995). 
According to Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, (2005) sensemaking is a way of creating a shared 
understanding that is plausible enough for a group to move toward action. Industry leaders use 
sensemaking activities such as environmental scanning and issue interpretation to determine the 
impact and control mechanisms necessary for organizational decisions and strategic change 
(Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Other stakeholders such as consumers and legislators use sensemaking 
activities to construct their global strategy (Pratt, 2000) and position (Gephart, 1993). 
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Many EUs have established a resource planning process for their environmental and economic 
sensemaking awareness. For example, a rolling three year integrated resource scenario planning 
(IRP) process is being used by Georgia Power Company (GPC) to help it be more responsive 
(ambidextrous) to the changing environment, as stated by an executive during a recent interview 
(Roberts, personal communication, October 29, 2014). A study of the social processes of 
sensemaking (Teece, 2007, 2010) suggests that with the advent of a disruptive technology, 
integrated resource scenario planning (IRP) is a critical tool for fostering organizational 
ambidexterity (OA) behaviors. An example of an IRP process (TVA IRP, 2010): 
 
1. Identify Public Issues and Relevant Concerns 
o Accumulate relevant issues and concerns from customers, employees, environmental 
groups, and other key stakeholders. 
2. Translate Public Issues and Concerns into Evaluation Criteria and Resource 
Options 
o Develop statements that reflect EU and stakeholder values to translate into an 
evaluation criteria. For example, impacts on rates, environment, and fuel prices are 
considerations in evaluating various future resource strategies. 
3. Identify Possible Future Conditions (Uncertainties) 
o Concerns and uncertainties are translated into future conditions. For example, high 
growth in electricity sales, high cost of natural gas, and increasing air emission 
controls in response to global warming are various future conditions. 
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4. Construct Scenarios 
o Scenarios are created and discussed in terms of its relevant attributes and objectives. 
Scenarios are then evaluated using modeling and simulation techniques to measure 
their performance against the evaluation criteria. 
5. Use Trade-Off Analysis to Find the Best Strategies for the Future 
o Once a set of feasible scenarios are developed, trade-offs are considered under the 
different future conditions. Discussions on trade-offs within the EU and stakeholders 
focus on how well various strategies might be able to meet selected evaluation criteria. 
 
Past studies (Maitlis, 2005; Carmeli & Halevi, 2009) have examined the critical roles played by 
leaders and stakeholders in the social processes of sensemaking. Maitlis’s (2005) four forms of 
the social processes of organizational sensemaking can help to identify the degree to which 
leaders and stakeholders engage in “sensegiving”. Maitlis (2005) said that sensegiving is the 
attempt to influence others’ understanding of an issue. Maitlis states,  
“Each of the four forms of organizational sensemaking guided, fragmented, restricted, 
and minimal is associated with a distinct set of process characteristics that capture the 
dominant pattern of interaction. They also each result in particular outcomes, 
specifically, the nature of the accounts and actions generated” (p.21). 
 
For this study Maitlis’s (2005) four distinct forms of the social processes of organizational 
sensemaking guided, fragmented, restricted, and minimal were used for two purposes. First, 
there was a need to organize the business model changes into the dominant patterns of 
interaction between the EU leader and the stakeholder (consumer, policymaker). These 
interactions or aggregate observable responses to internal (EU leaders) and external 
(stakeholders) were witnessed through the interviews conducted, recognized as behaviors 
21 
 
(stimuli) and grouped into Maitlis’s four distinct forms. Second, the four behavioral groups were 
placed into Maitlis’s (2005) 2x2 framework (Figure 5) and overlaid onto the Cameron (2006) 
Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF) framework described in the next section. 
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Figure 5 Four Forms of Organizational Sensemaking 
 
II.4 Competing Values Framework 
Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF) highlights the trade-offs, inherent tensions, 
contradictions, and paradoxes that face organizations and their leaders as they navigate complex 
and changing environments (Cameron, 2006). The basic framework is comprised of two 
dimensions that express the tensions or competing values that characterize all organizations. The 
center horizontal axis separates the continuum between flexibility, adaptability, and exploration 
and the continuum of control, alignment, and exploitation (as shown in Figure 6). The center 
vertical axis separates the continuum between efficient internal processes and capability versus 
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external positioning and opportunities related to stakeholders such as competitors, customers and 
investors. Each continuum highlights dichotomous performance criteria such as internal versus 
external orientation (horizontal axis) or flexibility versus control (vertical axis). Each quadrant 
has been labeled to describe its most notable characteristic. The CVF defines each quadrant: 
Collaborate (upper left), referring to team, group, fellowship among collaborators; Create (upper 
right), referring to the ability of people to collaborate in new, creative, and innovative ways; 
Compete (lower right), the ability to focus on results, attainment, and attention to the competitive 
landscape and external positioning; and Control (lower left), the ability to create, operate, and 
maintain structures and systems that support organizational control and learning (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006, 2011). The two upper quadrants share an emphasis on energy and flexibility. The 
two bottom quadrants emphasize control and stability. The two left-hand quadrants are both 
focused on internal capabilities whereas the two right-hand quadrants are externally focused. 
Contradictory elements are found through comparison of the diagonally, or diametrically, 
opposite quadrants (Figure 6). 
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 Flexibility and Energy  
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
 
COLLABORATE 
• team, group, fellowship 
among collaborators 
 
CREATE 
• ability of people to 
collaborate in new, 
creative, and innovative 
ways 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External 
 
CONTROL 
• create, operate and 
maintain structures and 
systems that support 
organizational control 
and learning 
 
COMPETE 
• focus on results, 
attainment and attention 
to the competitive 
landscape and external 
positioning 
 
 Control and Stability  
Figure 6  Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF) 
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III STUDY DESIGN 
This study uses a multiple case design (Lee, 1999; Yin, 2007) in which EU business model 
components are traced retrospectively beginning in 2009 through 2014. CEO annual reports, 
regulatory maps, and integrated resource plans are collected for each of the EUs interviewed. 
Interviews of key executives / managers from 11 electric utilities in 4 of the 10 states ranked 
highest in 2013 annual PV capacity additions of solar energy in the U.S. were conducted (Figure 
7). The fifth state, Vermont, one of the most progressive distributive customer-side business 
model solar states in the nation, was also recommended in a pilot interview with the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative representative from Washington D.C. Four pilot interviews were 
completed with EU executives and managers and one additional interview with a SolarCity 
executive. SolarCity is America's largest third-party solar power provider. Table 4 shows EUs 
interviewed by region, name, state, territory served, type, and interviewee title.  
 
Qualitative methods are well suited to the study of dynamic processes, especially where these 
processes are composed of individuals’ interpretations (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Hinings, 1997). 
Qualitative research typically examines issues from the perspective of the participant and is 
frequently used in the study of organization members’ constructions and accounts (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991; Isabella, 1990). This study uses an explorative qualitative research strategy to 
address the two research questions. The retrospective approach will be used in order to gain an 
in-depth understanding of how EU business models have changed since the beginning of the 
American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009 through 2014 (see Timeline Figure 2). 
 
Selection of interview candidates (Figure 7) involved a multi-step process. A recruitment script 
was sent to selected IOU and Co-op executives and managers within the five selected states. If a 
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reply was not received within two weeks, a phone call was made to the prospective executive or 
manager. If they agreed to an interview, an informed consent form was e-mailed to the 
interviewee for signature. On occasion, the interviewee recommended a key executive or 
manager to contact. Those references proved to be very valuable in Vermont, Colorado, and the 
Carolinas.  
 
The states that were selected aligned across four regions of the U. S. (Southeast, Northeast, 
Midwest, and Pacific). Each EU region has specific solar PV characteristics and inclinations that 
are likely to be factors in how an EU responds. The location may impact the direction of the 
issues and EU controls used to implement solar resources into their generation mix. For example, 
the Southeast region has some of the lowest electrical consumer rates in the country and some of 
the oldest and most established electric utilities. 
 
The Northeast region has higher electricity rates than the Southeast and their natural gas supply 
is limited due to confined pipeline access resulting in higher electric heating costs. The EU 
industry regards this region as highly progressive with new technology; there is a need to 
understand the EU impact and control mechanisms that are being proposed to reduce fuel costs. 
 
The Midwest has an influx of renewables associated with the wind belt and highly stringent 
renewable portfolio standards enacted by the states. Finally, the Pacific region (specifically 
Hawaii) presents national renewable leadership in solar installations and the highest electric rates 
in the United States. In addition, four pilot interviews were completed to confirm that the 
interview protocol is a comprehensive solar PV emergence discussion instrument. Last, the 
SolarCity interview was done to understand the solar emergence from an EU 
third-party business model competitor’s perspective. The interview protocol 
designed to match each of Richter’s (2001) business model 
is intensive, fifty percent of the interviews were 
percent were conducted by telephone.
 
Figure 
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Table 4 Summary of Interview Data Sources 
 
 
The similarity of the 11 electric utilities (4 investor-owned and 7 electric cooperatives) allows for 
meaningful stratified comparisons across the EU industry leaders and the stakeholders involved, 
while the diversity and the differences between the EUs provide a reasonable basis for 
Region Interviews & CEO Reports State Service Territory Investor-Owned Utility Cooperative Title
Pacific Kaua'i Island Utilities  Cooperative Hawaii Kaua'i x Power Supply Manager 
Pacific Hawaiian Electric Hawaii Oahu, Maui, Hawaii Island, Lanai and Molokai x Communication Specialist
Midwest Tri-States Generation & Transmission Association Colorado
Colorado, Nebraska, New 
Mexico and Wyoming x
Sr. Manager of Government 
Relations
Midwest Sangre de Cristo Electric Association Colorado Colorado x Energy Use Advisor
Northeast Vermont Electric Cooperative Vermont Vermont x CEO
Northeast Green Mountain Power Vermont Vermont x Director of Government Affairs
Southeast Georgia Power Company Georgia Georgia x Vice President of Pricing 
and Planning
Southeast Georgia Power Company Georgia Georgia x Green Energy Program Manager
Southeast Georgia Electric Membership Corporation Georgia Georgia x
Vice President of 
Government Relations
Southeast Electric Cooperatives of        South Carolina
South 
Carolina South Carolina x
Vice President for 
Government Affairs
Southeast Duke Energy South Carolina
South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Florida, Indiana, 
Ohio, Kentucky
x
Manager of Renewable 
Strategy
Southeast Santee Cooper South Carolina South Carolina State-owned
Sr. Vice President of 
Customer Service
Pilot Interviews
Southeast Georgia Transmission Corporation Georgia Georgia x Sr. Vice President of Transmission Policy
Southeast Georgia Transmission Corporation Georgia Georgia x Vice President of Transmission Planning
National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association United States United States x
Assistant Director of 
Regulatory Counsel
Pacific Anza Electric Cooperative California Southern California x General Manager
Pacific SolarCity Hawaii
AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, 
MA, MD, NJ, NV, NY, 
OR, PA, TX, WA, and DC
Director Policy and 
Electricity Market 
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generalizability. The retrospective approach is used in order to gain an in-depth understanding of 
how EUs business models are changing and becoming more ambidextrous in response to solar 
PV. 
 
The unit of analysis is the organizational level. The interviews are self-reports by senior 
managers of what their respective organizations have done and are doing, of prevailing attitudes 
towards solar PV and of their assessment of how well they are doing. Interviews are transcribed 
and then coded with the aid of NVivo and Leximancer software; secondary data is coded with 
Leximancer software. Both software programs are content analysis tools, however NVivo 
requires the researcher to define the coding scheme whereas Leximancer generates its own 
schema using word counts, word clustering, and proximity. Leximancer is also a text analytics 
tool that can be used to analyze the content of collections of textual documents and to display the 
extracted information visually. 
 
The Leximancer information is displayed by means of a conceptual map that provides a bird’s-
eye view of the material, representing the main concepts contained within the text as well as 
information about how concepts are related. The conceptual map allows the user to view the 
conceptual structure of a body of text, as well as perform a directed search of the documents. The 
interactive nature of the map permits the user to explore examples of concepts, their connections 
to each other, as well as links to the original text. Leximancer provides both a means of 
quantifying and displaying the conceptual structure of text and a means of using this information 
to explore interesting conceptual features. The 2009 and 2013 CEO reports and the IRP data 
were imported into the Leximancer software for conceptual map comparison. 
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Another secondary source of data is the regulatory map for each state which is compiled using 
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (Solar, D. S. I. R. E. 2012) which 
is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. DSIRE was established in 1995 and is currently 
operated by the N.C. Solar Center at N.C. State University with support from the Interstate 
Renewable Energy Council, Inc. The map includes state mandated renewable portfolio standards 
or renewable state goals (Figure 8). A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) has been established 
in 29 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. States shown in red have an RPS 
whereas states in orange have a renewable state goal. For example, Hawaii has a state mandated 
standard that a percentage of their load (40% by 2020) must be served by renewable resources or 
they will be penalized. Colorado, also in red, has a state renewable mandate that requires that 
30% of the IOUs load and 10% (recently changed to 20%) of the Co-ops load must be served by 
renewable resources by 2020. Typically, monetary penalties are enacted when RPS (red) 
standards are not met whereas RPS (orange) goals are typically tied to warnings to comply or 
monetary penalties may be enforced. 
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Figure 8 State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
Interviews, CEO reports, and the regulatory map for each state are analyzed using Richter’s 
business model components from both a utility-side and customer-side perspective (Table 2). 
The EU utility-side responses are expected to be more robust and complete because of their 
substantial experience resulting in more and larger projects. In addition, it might be expected that 
the Co-ops are lagging behind the IOUs in their response to disruptive technology and changing 
environment, perhaps due to a lack of resources to manage the work. 
 
III.1 Data Analysis 
The data analysis is comprised of three stages. Stage 1 is comprised of several steps of data 
reduction. First, all 16 interview narratives (IOUs, Co-ops, and SolarCity) are coded into NVivo 
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using the interview protocol responses associated with the four Richter (2011) business model 
components with the additional fifth regulatory component. The four IOU and seven Co-op 
narratives under study are then summarized into a 2x5 matrix for each EU. The matrix uses the 
characteristics of impact (stakeholder driven) and control (EU leader response) on one axis and 
the five EU business model components on the other. These characteristics help to interpret the 
business model behaviors and strategies associated with the stakeholder (consumers and 
policymaker) and EU leader interactions (Maitlis, 2005). Next, the Leximancer conceptual maps 
are developed from the interview and secondary data for longitudinal EU leader business model 
comparisons. Finally, a Competing Values Framework (CVF) is created for each EU to interpret 
ambidextrous behaviors. In the second stage, the first research question is addressed: 1) How 
have EUs responded to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar 
technology? 
In the third stage, the second research question is addressed: 2) What are the discernable 
business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and 
electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology? 
The analyses are described in detail below and shown in Figure 9. 
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16 Interviews and 
CEO/IRP Secondary Data 
Solar “Impact” and “Control” 
characteristics organized to Richter 
(2011) EU Business Model 
Components including Regulatory 
EU leader and stakeholder 
interactions are analyzed to identify 
sensemaking type. 
Integrate Cameron (2006) Competing 
Values Leadership Framework (CVF) 
CVF for each EU to help understand 
and interpret their ambidextrous 
behaviors associated with the 2009-
2014 EU business model changes 
Pilot Interviews 
Stage 1: Code the narratives and merge with secondary 
data. 
 
 
 
Stage 2: Combine EU leader business model issues into 
a 2x5 matrix to identify a set of solar PV issues that are 
comparable across business model components. 
 
 
 
 
Stage 3: Analyze business model data and behaviors to 
determine sensemaking type (guided, fragmented, 
restricted, and minimal). 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 4: Integrate sense-making type with CVF to 
interpret responses of the participants to determine the 
extent to which they exhibit ambidextrous behaviors 
 
 
 
Stage 5: Identify the comparisons and contrasting 
patterns between IOUs & Co-ops 
Figure 9 Data Analysis Flow Chart 
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III.1.1 Stage 1 - Code the narratives describing the EU business model process  
The initial data analysis stage begins with coding both the primary interviews and secondary data 
sources using solar PV EU business model issues (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). The primary 
data source is comprised of the 16 EU interviews using an instrument protocol derived from 
Richter’s (2011) four EU business model components and the additional regulatory component. 
The secondary data source is comprised of the EU 2009 and 2013 CEO annual reports, EU IRP 
documents, and the state regulatory maps from the same 11 EUs. These are processed using 
Leximancer to allow automatic coding of organizational issues. The solar PV issues that are 
identified in the interviews, annual reports, and IRP documents that involve a concern are 
mapped to one of Richter’s EU business model components. A typical issue must meet two 
criteria for inclusion. The first criterion is that an issue must be mentioned in all EUs, in all 
IOUs, or in all Co-ops. Meeting this criterion requires a process of data reduction (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) in which the solar issues are divided into subset characteristics within the business 
model components. The second criterion for inclusion is that data should be available from both 
the interviews and annual reports or IRP documents. The expectation is to have at least two 
subset issue characteristics within each Richter EU business model component: (1) Value 
Proposition: utility-side (grid reliability) and customer-side (energy conservation); (2) Customer 
Interface: utility-side (competition) and customer-side (distributed energy involvement); (3) 
Infrastructure: utility-side (centralized generation) and customer-side (net-metering or 
community solar); and (4) Revenue: utility-side (ownership) and customer-side (cross-subsidies). 
A fifth business model component is added to include Regulatory: utility-side (EPA carbon) and 
customer-side (leasing and net-metering). 
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III.1.2 Stage 2 - Identify the four forms of EU Leader and Stakeholder Interactions 
In searching for patterns of interaction in sensemaking (SM) there is a necessity to look for 
consistencies in EU executives and managers. Patterns are revealed through a series of steps. 
First, it is important to identify key EU leaders who controlled and/or were impacted by solar PV 
in their EU and examine their contribution to the business model changes. The analysis of the 
interview narratives may reveal various EU leaders as either playing major roles in virtually all 
solar PV business model component issues or making critical contributions to two or three 
issues. Next, by combining certain EU leader business model issues into a 2x5 matrix, it may 
then be possible to identify a set of solar PV issues that are comparable across business model 
components. Then, EU leader and stakeholder interactions are analyzed to identify how EU 
leaders contributed through various sensegiving activities. Statements or activities that involve 
providing plausible descriptions and explanations of extracted cues and constructing sensible 
environments for others (Weick, 1995) are included as bulleted EU leader sensegiving impact 
and control behaviors (2x5 matrix for each EU). For each EU there is a determination of which 
of the four forms of sensemaking (guided, fragmented, restricted, or minimal) is prevalent by 
counting the number of bulleted items and their frequency of involvement and determining the 
behavioral strength/intensity associated with the model changes to which they contributed 
through sensegiving activities. Finally, a CVF emerges for each EU to help understand and 
interpret their behaviors associated with the 2009 - 2014 EU business model changes. These 
findings are used to answer the first research question: 1) How have EUs responded to a shift in 
their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology? 
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In the third stage, the second research question is addressed: 2) What are the discernable 
business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and 
electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology? 
 
III.1.3 Stage 3 - Identify the differing patterns between IOUs and Co-ops 
Identification of differing patterns requires focusing on the stakeholder accounts of EU impact 
and EU leader actions of control associated with solar PV in their electric service territories. 
Comparing the EU leadership in conditions of dynamic change is done by tracing through the 
2x5 EU business model matrices developed above for each EU CVF. This comparison leads to a 
set of descriptors that capture the differing business model patterns and ambidextrous behaviors 
between IOUs and Co-ops. Through this iterative cross-case analysis, descriptions of the 
differing patterns and behaviors are determined for each region. For these patterns, a Co-op is 
generalizable to a medium-sized not-for-profit enterprise where an IOU is generalizable to a 
large-sized private organization. An overview of data analysis is shown in Figure 9 and the CVF 
template in Figure 10. 
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Guided Sensemaking 
(High Control, High Impact) 
 
Process Characteristics 
• Long-term Change 
• Teambuilder Type Leader 
• Communication Value 
Proposition 
• Effectiveness = Employee 
Development & Empowerment 
 
Outcome:  Contextual Ambidexterity 
• Sustaining the organization and 
its culture through stakeholder 
engagement & development of 
employees 
• Behaviors: High Supportive and 
High Directive - Coaching 
 
Fragmented Sensemaking 
(Low Control, High Impact) 
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• New Change 
• Entrepreneur Type Leader 
• Transformational Value 
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• Effectiveness = Innovativeness 
& Vision 
 
Outcome:  Structural Ambidexterity 
• Creating the future through 
innovation 
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Restricted Sensemaking 
(High Control, Low Impact) 
 
Process Characteristics 
• Incremental Change 
• Organizer Type Leader 
• Consistency Value Proposition 
• Effectiveness = Control & 
Efficiency 
 
Outcome: Structural Ambidexterity 
• Operating the organization 
efficiently through continuous 
improvement 
• Behaviors: High Directive and 
Low Supportive - Directing  
 
Minimal Sensemaking 
(Low Control, Low Impact) 
 
Process Characteristics: 
• Fast Change 
• Competitor Type Leader 
• Market Share Value Proposition 
• Effectiveness = Aggressively 
Competing & Customer Focus 
 
Outcome:  Contextual Ambidexterity 
• Expanding the organization 
through acquiring financial 
capital & attentiveness to 
customers 
• Behaviors: Low Supportive and 
Low Directive - Delegating 
 
Control Control and Exploitation (OA) 
 
        EU Leader Sensegiving              (Control)          EU Leader Sensegiving 
                      High                                                                        Low 
Compete 
Figure 10 Integrating Business Model Changes with CVF to Interpret OA 
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IV  RESULTS 
This section presents the results from the 16 interviews with investor-owned and electric 
cooperatives within five states that are considered solar forerunners in the United States (SEIA, 
2013, 2014). The results address the impact of solar photovoltaics on the EU market first by state 
and then by region. Next, the EU business model changes and OA behaviors that have helped 
EUs respond to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 are discussed and finally the 
discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned 
(urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs are considered. 
IV.1 Hawaii - Pacific Region: KIUC (Co-op) and HEI (IOU) 
IV.1.1 Guided Sensemaking and Contextual Ambidexterity 
Hawaii has the nation’s most expensive electricity because it relies on imported fuels for more 
than 90% of its total energy, pushing prices up to an average $0.34 per kWh (kilowatt hour) for 
2014 (prices through November), compared to 11 cents per kWh for the national average. 
Imported oil currently accounts for around 71% of Hawaii’s electricity generation, followed by 
16% from coal and 13% from renewables. These high prices have given solar a competitive 
edge. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2013), wind and solar in 
Hawaii are economically attractive alternatives, especially as their technology costs have come 
down in recent years. Between 2010 and 2014, solar capacity has soared across Hawaii’s main 
islands. By 2030, Hawaii expects to triple its solar capacity and have renewables supply 65% of 
the state’s electricity (SEIA, 2014). Hawaii’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) targets 15% 
renewables by 2015, 20% by 2020, and 40% by 2030. Typically Co-ops are not regulated by the 
state’s public utility commission (PUC), but in Hawaii, KIUC is mandated to meet the RPS 
standard just like HEI.  
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Data analysis reveals KIUC and HEI business model components that are highly collaborative 
value-enhancing activities resulting in the guided form of SM. The focus of these organizations 
is on building cohesion through consensus and satisfaction through organizational involvement. 
KIUC and HEI’s 2009 to 2014 trajectories point to collaboration signifying that contextual OA 
had developed and was increasing during the time period (See Figure 11 Leximancer bar chart). 
The KIUC and HEI leaders were very active in constructing and promoting understanding and 
explanations of the solar energy business impact on their service territories with customers, 
legislators, and the Hawaii Public Utility Commission (HPUC). At the same time, KIUC and 
HEI were also actively engaged with stakeholders in attempting to collaborate on policies for 
cost-sharing by implementing a fixed solar charge and proposing an avoided-cost for net-
metering rates. These proposed policies were guided primarily by KIUC and HEI with the 
HPUC. 
KIUC and HEI business model component analysis also identified value-enhancing activities 
within the competing values “Compete” framework that included aggressiveness and 
forcefulness with HPUC in the pursuit of market share (rate decoupling) and utility-side solar 
ownership competitiveness. The HPUC continues to implement regulatory obstacles forcing HEI 
to own no solar generation. Peter Rosegg, HEI Communication Specialist, explains, “We have 
an isolated system and we’re under a lot of pressure from the HPUC not to own generation at 
all, much less for us to go venturing into the utility-side solar area that we have no experience 
in.” 
The HPUC generation ownership position has created some tension with HEI. If third-parties 
own the majority of the solar generation, then HEI loses some control of operations which may 
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affect reliability. Losing utility-side generation control and customer-side market share through 
the solar emergence in Hawaii reinforces the need for HEI and KIUC to increase the capability 
of enhancing their value creating competencies, specifically within their infrastructure and 
distribution services. In 2013 HEI estimates that $38 million was shifted to non-solar customers 
for grid upkeep. As the core mission of any organization is to create value, KIUC and HEI have 
established goals that their shareholders (IOU) and customer-owners (Co-op) are expecting from 
them. KIUC’s goal is to reduce residential bills by 10% over next 10 years, generate 50% of 
electricity by renewables by 2023, reduce carbon levels to 1990 levels by 2023, establish a rate 
structure to decouple margin from sales level to minimize subsidies between customer classes, 
and to recover more of the actual cost of service through fixed charges. In this environment, 
there is a need for Collaboration and Competitiveness. Cameron (2006) describes this leadership 
behavior as speedy teamwork or urgent collaboration or “Autonomous Engagement”. (See Figure 
42) 
This integration of positive-opposites quadrants “Collaborate” and “Compete” or paradoxical 
leadership behavior describes an EU leader that emphasizes teamwork and collaboration as well 
as speed and urgency. Cameron (2006) explains, “leaders that act with autonomous engagement 
actively seek involvement, but with secure and well-grounded motives.” The integration of these 
two contradictory concepts within an organization have enabled Hawaii’s EUs to create a 
contextually ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways to create 
organizational value. 
IV.1.2 Hawaii business model changes and OA 
KIUC, who serves the island of Kauai (5% of Hawaii’s population), has been a leader in utility-
side solar power installations where their power supply mix will soon reach 15% solar and 40% 
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renewable.  By contrast, HEI’s territory is more populated and the solar PV focus of HEI has 
been on customer-side solar. The HPUC has forced its attention on HEI leaving the utility-side 
generation business model, becoming more distribution service-based, and continuing to increase 
their 11% customer-side solar mix. 
For example, the Leximancer 2009 CEO reports show that KIUC and HEI consider solar energy 
a value proposition to Hawaii. The Leximancer 2013 CEO report shows that KIUC, who was 
beginning to install utility-side solar, is concerned about its grid; HEI, who was beginning to 
become oversubscribed on customer-side solar, has concerns about losing its customer market 
share to SolarCity. The KIUC and HEI interview data reveals concerns with net-metering, solar 
cost-sharing, and grid operations. These utility-side and customer-side issues have forced the 
EUs to change their business models pointing to an evolving ambidextrous organization that is 
enhancing its value creating competencies, specifically within its infrastructure and distribution 
services. When business model components are linked to the Collaborate and Create CVF 
leadership dimension, an EU organizational ambidexterity type emerges. 
EU leaders from the Co-op, IOU, and the HPUC recognize that there is value for all parties in 
meeting the state Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in that renewables can effectively reduce 
generation costs to half.  Customer issues like net-metering, solar cost-sharing and grid 
operations were recognized through interactions in meetings with investors, consumers, and 
legislators which were organized systematically and typically planned in advance. 
Both EUs have managed solar grid operations without adding additional departments or 
organizations. HEI noted in its interview that the degradation of revenue and increase in 
operational demands have been discussed and partially resolved in the regulatory environment 
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where stakeholder engagement and knowledge of the issues benefit the whole. Recently, HEI 
and HPUC leaders have focused special attention on the backlog of customer-side rooftop 
requests in an effort to reduce the installation queue list. With approximately 48,000 current 
statewide solar customers and 500,000 potential customers, KIUC and HEI have teamed up with 
SolarCity and industry subject matter experts to understand the problem and develop stakeholder 
solutions. The concern is large amounts of rooftop solar energy overloading the capacity of the 
grid. Overall, controlling the impact of the solar energy emergence via intelligent, systematic and 
coordinated business model changes reveals contextual ambidexterity behaviors as shown within 
the CVF Collaborate and Create dimensions. 
IV.1.3 Identified differing business model patterns of HEI (IOU) and KIUC (Co-op) 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 reveal by product of analysis that guided SM in the state of Hawaii 
is prominent because the solar impact and control construct affects all five EU business model 
components. A common theme throughout these analyses is that the regulatory component is a 
foundation for the other four EU business model components. This regulatory foundation allows 
stakeholders time to work with legislators to develop systematic and controlled approaches to 
reconfiguring constructions of the solar energy emergence. In Hawaii, the strong competitive 
edge of solar allows the state HPUC and EUs to engage easily and to incorporate the viewpoints 
of the many different stakeholders. In addition, KIUC and HEI identified that they did not 
develop new solar departments to handle the additional solar utility-side and customer-side 
rooftop growth. All of these results reveal that KIUC and HEI are both displaying contextual 
ambidexterity which emerged as a more decentralized business model on the solar challenges. 
Brad Rockwell, KIUC Power Supply Manager explains, 
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“We thought solar would be an easy thing to do. I think one of the keys to success was 
putting the development of it on the power plant guys, basically in my department, 
because then it wasn’t like you had a separate department away from the operational guy 
that was trying to develop a renewable. I think a lot of utility companies try to do that—
they kind of create a separate special renewable group and then you get the renewable 
guys are trying to develop stuff and push the envelope and then these operational guys 
are coming with—ah, don’t screw up—you know they come up with all these really harsh 
criteria that are almost impossible for the renewable guys to meet because they don’t 
want the conventional units to be impacted whatsoever. So by the fact that our boss put it 
on us to make it work, we’re not able to point the finger at anyone except ourselves if it 
doesn’t work. I think we’re doing that as much as anyone I’ve heard of. Like I said, we 
have physically added only one body to do all this.” 
 
An interesting finding in Hawaii is the impact of the regulatory component on the nature of 
subsequent EU actions. For example, the collaborative partnership with SolarCity and various 
research labs allowed HEI and KIUC to understand and resolve the operational constraints of 
heavily solar connected circuits and, with the help of the HPUC, communicate these results to 
the stakeholders. This proactive collaborative research opened up the queue and reduced the 
backlog of customer-side rooftop solar requests. Thus these activities were based on a shared 
interaction of KIUC’s and HEI’s competitive context and the value of collaboration which 
facilitated the consistency of their EU control mechanisms over time. 
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Table 5 KIUC Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
Consumer 
Savings 
Staffing  to 
manage the 
customer-side 
solar requests 
Excess 
generation on an 
islanded system 
High cost of 
power 
RPS 
Negotiations 
Utility-side and 
Customer-side 
solar ownership 
Lost (SolarCity) 
Market Share Cost-sharing 
Net-
metering Net-metering 
EU 
Control 
Operational 
Flexibility 
discussions with 
stakeholders 
Member 
Communication 
and Engagement 
Battery 
smoothing for 
frequency 
variations with 
intermittent 
solar 
Renewables 
driven by 
BOD 
Fixed solar 
charge 
Employee 
Involvement 
Solar contractor 
collaboration 
Technology 
improvements 
Replace oil 
with solar - 
lower rates 
Avoided Cost 
Cohesion 
through 
Consensus 
Provide 
distribution 
Services 
 
Unbundle 
net-metering 
rates 
Engineering 
Collaboration 
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Table 6 HEI Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
Consumer 
Savings 
Staffing  to 
manage the 
customer-
side solar 
requests 
Established reliable 
EU infrastructure 
and operating 
system 
Highest rates 
in the country 
at 35 cents per 
kilowatt hour 
State 
Residential 
Energy Income 
Tax Credit of 
35% 
Customer-
side solar 
ownership 
Lost 
(SolarCity) 
Market Share 
In 2013, $38 M 
shifted to non-solar 
customers for grid 
upkeep 
Net-metering Net-metering 
EU 
Control 
Employee 
Involvement 
Consumer 
and 
Policymaker 
relationships 
HPUC forcing HEI 
to bid all new 
utility-side solar to 
third-parties to 
reduce generation 
ownership 
Renewables 
driven by 
HPUC 
Retail rate 
structure is 
outdated and 
does not 
address the 
issue of 
unrecovered 
fixed cost 
Guaranteed 
Cost 
Recovery 
Through 
Rates 
Provide 
distribution 
Services 
Established reliable 
EU infrastructure 
and operating 
system. 
HPUC 
recognizes that 
there needs to 
be some 
interim and 
long-term 
revenue 
changes 
Issued technical 
requirements 
for solar 
installations 
 
IV.1.4 Analysis for Hawaii 
Interviews and CEO reports were analyzed with the Leximancer text-mining software where 
words that occur very frequently are treated as concepts. The software includes an interactive 
concept-mapping function which provides an overview of the conceptual structure of the data set 
that assists in interpretation. Leximancer produced a set of concept maps that facilitated an 
analysis showing how ideas and concepts in EU business models have changed from 2009 - 
2014. The analysis was designed by tagging solar as the category of interest and the EU business 
model components (value, customer, infrastructure, revenue, and regulatory) as concepts to 
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investigate. A software generated bar chart identifies the most prominent concepts within the 
particular category – defined via a measure of the combination of their strength and frequency 
characteristics (see Figure 11). The relative frequency is a measure of the conditional probability 
of the concept given the category. That is, how likely is it that the concept “customer” is 
mentioned in the solar category?  Strength is a measure of the conditional probability of the 
category given the particular concept. On the graph, by looking at the position of the individual 
concepts, it is possible to determine the closeness of their semantic relationship to other 
concepts. The prominence of a concept in the data set is indicated by the size of the dot - the 
more prominent, the concept, the larger the dot. If a concept sits close to solar it is, in relative 
terms, more associated with that concept. Similarly the more central a concept’s location on the 
map, the more it is shared with other concepts. Leximancer also ranks compound concepts and 
concept count from the original base data.   
 
For example the KIUC interview was mapped in Figure 11. The “customer” concept is the most 
prominent concept within the “solar” category. This is not surprising since KIUC is a Co-op and 
the customers are the owners of the EU. Not shown in the bar chart but identified in the 
Leximancer report is that the most prominent concept pair was “value” and “infrastructure” and 
that these two concepts, along with “rate”, were mentioned most in the interview. 
 
Each EU is evaluated using the Leximancer data map related to the business model changes that 
occurred during the shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014. The discernable business model 
patterns that differ between investor-owned (urban) and electric cooperative (rural) are recorded 
in Table 19. 
 Figure 11 KIUC Interview (Co
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-op #1 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 12 KIUC 2009 CEO Report 
 
Figure 13 KIUC 2013 CEO Report (Co
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(Co-op #1 - Leximancer) 
 
-op #1 - Leximancer) 
 
 
The analysis of KIUC identifies that the focus 
increasing due to the dependence on 
questioning the viability and value 
2013, the CEO focus was on installing more utility
transmission grid. The concern about operability with intermittent resources had 
utility-side solar appeared to be the best strategy to prevent customer
increase customer satisfaction by lowering rates
installing utility-side solar and biomass increased 
bar chart report reveals a larger focus on 
was taking a primary role in the g
popular for customer-side installations utilizing net
business model has become a supporting innovation for KIUC and the customer
model market has been slow to develop because third
need for a market presence yet with such a small market share.
Figure 14  HEI Interview (IOU #1 
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of the CEO in 2009 was that KIUC
foreign oil for generation and their customer
of adding solar to the existing infrastructure (electric grid)
-side renewables (solar and bio
-side lost revenue and 
. In 2014, the interview revealed that the 
as customer rates decreased. The Leximancer 
stakeholder discussions at the regulatory level. As s
eneration mix, the regulatory component was becoming more 
-metering. In summary, the solar utility
-
-party providers like SolarCity do not see a 
 
 
- Leximancer) 
’s rates were 
-owners were 
. In 
-mass) to the 
decreased and 
value of 
olar 
-side 
side business 
 
Figure 15 HEI 2009 CEO Report (IOU #1 
Figure 16 HEI 2013 CEO Report (IOU #1 
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- Leximancer) 
 
- Leximancer) 
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The analysis of HEI identifies that the focus of the CEO in 2009 was on shareholder value, 
infrastructure erosion discussions at the HPUC, and regulatory environment on renewable solar 
energy. The concern was that the fundamental EU business model was changing. In 2013, the 
CEO focus shifted to the needs of the customers and how solar energy was being debated at the 
regulatory level with the HPUC. There was much less focus on the infrastructure and more 
concern about lost revenue through customer-side rooftop installations (net-metering). The value 
proposition appeared to be in renewables particularly solar to lower fuel costs. In 2014, the 
interview conversation focused on the insurgence of solar within the HEI service territory and 
the concerns that it brought to grid management and cost-sharing rates. There was also a focus 
on third-party ownership of large utility-side solar. HPUC wants HEI to stay out of the solar 
generation business and become a distribution service provider to keep costs down. In summary, 
the HEI business model is changing to a distribution provider with an increase in engineering 
services for grid management. Due to the increase in SolarCity rooftop leasing and increase in 
third-party utility-side solar ownership, HEI is getting squeezed into the distribution service 
market. Changes in the regulatory environment from 2010 - 2014 were minimal and Hawaii has 
shown a steady growth emergence of solar with a very friendly net-metering environment for the 
consumer. In 2013, $614 million was invested in Hawaii to install solar for home, business and 
utility use. This is a 22% increase over the previous year. Solar installed prices have reduced by 
8% from last year and 34% from 2010. Table 7 provides a regulatory overview of the present 
federal and state credits available along with the IRP, EU goals, RPS and net-metering status. 
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Table 7 Hawaii Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE* 
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
of 30% that expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016. 
2. State: Commercial, Residential, and Multi-family Energy Income Tax Credit of 35%. 
3. IRP framework adopted by HPUC in 1992, KIUC formed in 2002, HPUC adds Clean Energy 
Scenario Planning to IRP in 2010, 2013 HPUC rejects HEI IRP. 
4. KIUC Goals: Reduce residential bill by 10% over next 10 years, generate 50% of electricity by 
renewables by 2023, reduce carbon levels to 1990 levels by 2023, establish rate structure to 
decouple margin from sales level to minimize subsidies between customer classes and to recover 
more of the actual cost of service through fixed charges. KIUC (Kauai has 5% of state’s 
population) is presently at 13.3% renewables in 2014 with a 71% potential for 2020. 
5. RPS: Cooperative and IOU must comply with 15% renewable energy net sales by 12/31/15, 25% 
by 12/31/20, and 40% by 12/31/2030. 
6. Net-Metering: 100 kW limit for HECO, MECO, HELCO customers with a 15% per circuit 
distribution threshold. KIUC limit is 50 kW per customer with a 1% peak demand threshold. Net 
excess is credited to customer’s bill at the retail rate at approximately $0.34 per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh). 
 
*DSIRE is the most comprehensive source of information on incentives and policies that support renewables and 
energy efficiency in the United States. Established in 1995, DSIRE is operated by the N.C. Clean Energy Technology 
Center at N.C. State University and is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. 
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IV.2 Colorado - Midwest Region: Tri-State (Co-op) and Sangre de Cristo (Co-op) 
IV.2.1 Guided Sensemaking and Contextual Ambidexterity 
Colorado has some of the lowest rates in the country at approximately 12 cents per kWh and 
ranks as having one of the best net-metering policies in the country. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2013, 64% of the electricity generated in Colorado 
came from coal, 20% from natural gas, and 17% from renewable energy resources. Colorado's 
RPS requires IOUs to provide 30% of their generation from renewable energy resources by 
2020, surprisingly the city of Aspen’s goal is 100% renewable resources by 2015, and Co-ops 
serving 100,000 or more meters must comply with 20% by 2020. 
 
Data analysis reveals Tri-State and Sangre de Cristo Electric business model activities are 
collaborative value-enhancing guided SM activities. The focus of these EU organizations is on 
the integration of organizational involvement with policymakers and consumer advocates. Tri-
State’s and Sangre de Cristo’s 2009 to 2014 behavioral trajectories point to a guided form 
signifying that contextual OA had developed and was increasing during this time period (Figure 
43). In this environment the EU leaders demonstrate patience, support, and compassion for 
consumers but also demonstrate power and challenges for stakeholders to improve. Cameron 
(2006) identifies this leadership behavior as “Caring Confrontation” where leaders are “patient 
and powerful, compassionate and bold, selfless and challenging” (Cameron et.al, 2006, p. 80). 
For example, the Colorado Public Utility Commission (CPUC) continues to implement 
regulatory obstacles against EUs forcing Tri-State to build and purchase additional and 
unnecessary solar generation to meet the Co-op RPS mandate of 20% by 2020. Dave Lock, Sr. 
Manager, Government Relations, explains; “The Colorado RPS was at 10% then just two years 
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ago the legislature increased it to 20% without warning and now it is at 20% for Co-ops and 
30% for IOUs.” 
 
In this regulatory environment, there is a need for collaboration (Caring) and competition 
(Confrontation). This integration of positive-opposites or paradoxical leadership behavior 
establishes an EU leader that emphasizes the welfare of the state before personal interests, but 
also challenges stakeholders and employees to live up to a high standard leader type model. 
Cameron (2006) explains that people respond to leaders that “tell it like it is”, challenging 
mediocrity but practicing kindness and compassion. These CVF behaviors enabled Colorado 
EUs to create a contextually ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways 
to create organizational value. 
IV.2.2 Colorado business model changes and OA 
The business model components identified were value-enhancing activities within the CVF 
Compete quadrant that included minimal sensemaking requiring confrontations and challenges 
with the CPUC in the pursuit of market share (residential rate decoupling), Co-op regulation 
pressures, and utility-side solar grid upgrade costs. This minimal SM form and CVF dimension 
(Competing) characterizes the impact of solar installations in varying degrees throughout the 
country. For example, Dave Lock explains the sensitivity surrounding the fact that the Co-ops 
are not regulated by the CPUC except for the RPS, 
“For the RPS, yes, that’s an interesting question, because there is great sensitivity as to 
whether or not we’re regulated. Of course, we don’t want to be. So what the Legislature 
did is that we have to write a report and submit it to the CPUC on an annual basis to 
show what our progress is toward reaching the 20% goal, but they have no authority 
over us. There is nothing in the Statute that describes what happens if we don’t meet it. I 
mean, there is no penalty, there’s nothing, so theoretically, a member of one of our Co-
ops could sue us and say you aren’t meeting the standard and a court would decide 
whether we are or not and if we’re not, I’m sure that they would then order us to. But 
we’re planning on complying.” 
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An additional issue lies with the differences in an IOU like Xcel Energy Colorado and a Co-op 
like Tri-State Colorado in regard to cost recovery. Dave Lock explains, 
“Xcel is doing the same thing that we’re doing; they’re just integrating solar into their 
business model.  You know, as a vertically integrated IOU, it’s a little different, you know 
they can go to the CPUC and get cost recovery for the capital investments they are 
making, so they are incentivized to actually build the stuff on their own rather than do a 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), like we do, because when they build on their own 
they can get a rate of return on that invested capital.  It’s good for the shareholders, 
arguably maybe not so great for their customers, but that’s the approach they take. Of 
course, for the Co-ops, the customers are our owners, and we’re trying to provide power 
to them at the least amount of cost that we possibly can.” 
 
In Colorado EU leaders are also working to define what value creation means to them in regard 
to the EPA Clean Power Plan. With 67% of the Colorado electric capacity coming from coal and 
an EPA 30% reduction mandate looming to reduce carbon-based fuel emissions by 2030, EU 
leaders will have to confront stakeholders with an energy resource plan that will increase rates. 
Cameron’s (2006) “Caring Confrontation” leadership behavior in Colorado has helped EUs 
make their desired patterns clear to their employees and stakeholders with a focus on key value 
drivers that motivate employees and create a competitive roadmap to prevent rate increases and 
loss of market share. 
 
Another example of minimal sensemaking (SM) occurred two years ago in the Colorado 
legislative session. Without warning Colorado’s RPS was increased from 10% to 20%. The EUs 
were not prepared for rebuttal and are now dealing with the consequences. Bill Bennett with 
Sangre de Cristo Electric described the RPS change in the following way: 
“Senate Bill 252, was introduced with only a handful of days left in the Session, no 
discussion with Tri-State, no discussion with the Colorado Rural Electric Authority 
(CREA), our statewide cooperative organization, no discussion with any Cooperative, 
they just introduced it and passed it because they had the votes, and it caused an outrage 
in the State….There was extreme outrage over the way they handled that.” 
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Sensegiving from the EU leaders and legislators was minimal at that time, but EU leaders have 
since engaged with regulators and policy makers regarding over-regulation to confront the 
impact and control through caring and ownership. This CVF positive-opposite leadership 
behavior is another step toward contextual ambidexterity. In 2012, Xcel Energy (IOU) in 
Colorado opened the door with a new type of distributed energy service, community solar 
gardens. Community solar gardens are centrally located solar arrays whose output is shared by 
within county subscribers who pay an upfront or monthly payment to the developer. These 
gardens are located close to the load reducing the necessity for large transmission lines. Xcel sets 
up the program and has publicly endorsed the community solar garden product. The garden’s 
energy is sold to Xcel at a retail rate plus renewable energy credit (REC) and then credited to the 
subscribers at the avoided cost rate. Solar gardens enable small business and people who live in 
an apartment, don't have a sunny roof or can't afford a full solar array to buy or lease a piece of 
an array. The annual savings for a one kilowatt share in one of the Boulder gardens is about 
$270, according to Clean Energy Collective, a Carbondale-based company developing 11 Xcel 
solar gardens. Solar gardens laws have been established in Colorado, Delaware, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington, and are pending in California, the District of 
Columbia, and Maryland. 
IV.2.3 Identified differing business model patterns of Tri-State (Co-op) and Sangre de 
Cristo (Co-op) 
Solar processes have impacted the EU business model from 2009 - 2014 in Colorado. In 2009, 
EU leaders and stakeholders had variable understandings of a variety of renewable energy 
perspectives and EU actions of control that created minimal sensemaking. For example, in 2013 
the policymakers increased the Co-op RPS percentage to 20% from 10% without any 
collaborative discussion involving the Co-ops. These accounts of impact also tended to 
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accumulate over time in legislative committees. In 2013, Colorado EU leaders and stakeholders 
initiated a change from minimal to guided sensemaking. EU behavior changed to a “Caring 
Confrontation” concept when the EUs instituted a renewed focus on customer service to their 
Co-op member systems, investors, and stakeholders. This was also true for the city of Aspen 
when they changed their goal to 100% renewable by 2015. Ken Anderson, Tri-State Executive 
Vice President & General Manager, states in 2014, 
“In 2013, 52 megawatts of Co-op renewable energy projects were constructed or under 
development. Tri-State persists in analyzing our approach to cost effectively address an 
expanded Colorado renewable energy mandate passed by the state legislature of which 
the major components become effective in 2020. We had a renewed focus on customer 
service to our member systems, and instituted an advisory council on demand response 
and energy shaping products to support the success of these important initiatives. Tri-
State continues to be engaged with regulators and policy makers regarding over-
regulation of utilities in the environmental, energy policy and reliability sectors, and we 
continue to take steps to support compliance, reduce liabilities, control costs and create 
efficiencies in these areas.” 
 
A 2013 Colorado Energy Report prepared for the Colorado Office of Economic Development 
provides evidence of EU support for a caring and supportive behavioral change, 
“Colorado is at the center of this diversity and technology innovation, which presents 
both great challenges and great opportunities, e.g., questions such as how do we manage 
a grid that is fed by the sun and the wind as well as traditional sources; how do we plan a 
transportation system in a city, a region or a nation when multiple vehicle types and fuel 
types are demanded? Colorado’s great opportunity is to develop a collaborative 
environment where the state’s abundant and diverse energy resources and technology 
innovations can be united and integrated to allow the industry to grow in a manner that 
will provide energy solutions that serve the state, national and global markets.” 
 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) cite “organizational isolation” as a possible inhibitor to success in 
ambidexterity situations. The concept of organizational isolation is that separate exploration 
organizations often lose touch with the needs of the core business. This describes what happened 
in Colorado in 2009. Structural ambidexterity was not working and a change was needed. When 
the EU leaders found the balance between having patience, support, and compassion for 
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consumers and stakeholders and knowing when to challenge legislators, contextual 
ambidexterity emerged. As revealed in the examples above, the impact of the regulatory 
component on the nature of subsequent EU actions was significant. 
 
Table 8 Tri-State Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
Third-party 
solar services 
Lost Market 
Share 
(SolarCity) 
Utility-side 
solar would 
require 
transmission 
upgrades that 
are very costly 
Community 
solar 
gardens with 
no aggregate 
capacity 
limit 
Provides 
transmission to 
other states with a 
single postage stamp 
rate (socialized 
solar) 
Utility-side 
ownership Leasing 
Excess Net-
metering 
Net-
metering 
In 2013, the 
legislature increased 
the RPS from 10% 
to 20% without 
warning. 
EU 
Control 
Employee 
Involvement 
Renewed 
focus on 
customer 
service 
Cost-sharing 
(Fixed Charge) 
Renewables 
driven by 
BOD 
Need cost recovery 
mechanisms for 
owning solar rather 
than third-party PPA 
Provide 
distribution 
Services 
Solar 
contractor 
collaboration 
Solar (VER) 
discussions with 
stakeholders 
Building 
Solar 
Gardens 
Engaged with 
regulators and 
policy makers 
regarding over-
regulation 
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Table 9 Sangre de Cristo Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
Third-party 
solar services 
Lost Market 
Share 
(SolarCity) 
Interconnection 
requirements 
Community 
solar gardens 
with no 
aggregate 
capacity limit 
Federal Tax 
Credit 
Utility-side 
ownership Leasing 
Excess Net-
metering Net-metering 
Fear that RPS 
will increase 
again 
EU 
Control 
Employee 
Involvement 
Renewed focus 
on customer 
service 
Cost-sharing 
(Fixed Charge) 
Renewables 
driven by 
BOD 
Lobbying to 
unbundle 
Retail Rate 
Distribution 
Services 
Solar contractor 
collaboration 
Distribution 
services 
Co-op has 
Solar Tariff 
Engaged with 
regulators and 
policy makers 
regarding 
over-
regulation 
Figure 17  Tri-State Interview (Co
 
Figure 18  Tri-State 2009 Ceo Report (Co
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-op #2 - Leximancer) 
 
-Op #2 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 19 Tri-State 2013 CEO Report (Co
               
Figure 20 Sangre de Cristo Interview (Co
 
The analysis of Tri-State and Sangre de Cristo will be combined because they are both 
similar business model issues. Tri-State identifies that the focus 
stakeholder relationships and future
contentious and needed a refocus after the recent RP
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-op #2 - Leximancer) 
 
-op #3 - Leximancer) 
Co
of the CEO in 2009 was on the 
 resource commitments. The relationship with stakeholders was
S change without warning. In 2013, the CEO 
 
-ops and have 
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reported Tri-State was addressing the Colorado renewable energy mandates passed by the state legislature 
in a cost effective manner. Both Co-ops initiated a renewed focus on customer service for their customers 
and Tri-State instituted an advisory council on demand response and energy shaping products to support 
the success of stakeholder relationships. In 2014, the conversation was primarily on lost revenue and how 
Tri-State would allocate cost for the solar mandates in Colorado to Wyoming and New Mexico when they 
were using a single transmission postage stamp rate for all of the states. Cost allocation and increased 
rates have affected the consumers of Colorado due to the additional costs associated with customer-side 
and utility-side solar. Variable energy resources (solar and wind) are replacing very reliable fossil-fueled 
plants to meet the RPS percentage. In summary, as the EU business model has changed, so has the EU 
behavior to a “Caring Confrontation” concept as shown when the EUs instituted a renewed focus on 
customer service to their stakeholders. Table 10 below provides a perspective of the present renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS), investment tax credits (ITC), and renewable goals within the state. 
Table 10 Colorado Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE* 
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 of 30% 
expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016. 
2. State: Exemptions from state sales tax through 7/20/19, Xcel (IOU) performance-based incentive, and 
various utility and city tax rebate programs 
3. RPS: City of Aspen goal is 100% by 2015. IOU must comply with 30% by 2020. Electric cooperatives 
serving 100,000 or more meters must comply with 20% by 2020 with a distributed generation provision. 
Cooperatives serving less than 100,000 meters 10% by 2020 with a distributed generation provision. 
Municipals 10% by 2020. 
4. Net-Metering: Capacity is limited to 120% of average annual consumption for IOU customers. Capacity 
is limited to 10 kW for residential and 20 kW for non-residential cooperative and municipal customers. 
Meter aggregation is allowed for IOU customers and community solar gardens are allowed.  
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IV.3 Vermont - Northeast Region: Green Mountain (IOU) and VEC (Co-op) 
IV.3.1 Restricted Sensemaking and Structural Ambidexterity 
Vermont like Colorado has been very friendly to solar and ranks as one of the best net-metering 
states in the country. Vermont does not have an RPS but there is an established renewable 
generation goal of 20% by 2017, 75% renewable by 2032, and 90% by 2050. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), nuclear power accounted for 70% of the 
electricity generated within Vermont in 2013, a higher share than any other state and 20% of 
Vermont’s net electricity generation was produced from conventional hydroelectric power. In 
2011, Vermont had the lowest carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation among the 
50 states. Vermont’s residential rate is approximately 17 cents per kWh. 
 
The restricted form of sensemaking occurred when the EU business model changes were highly 
controlled by the EUs while experiencing low impact by the emerging solar PV technology 
(Figure 44). This form of SM was typified by Vermont Electric Cooperative (VEC) and Green 
Mountain Power (GMP) in the state of Vermont. In each of these cases, EU leaders who engaged 
in high levels of sensegiving developed processes to control the issues they encountered, whereas 
stakeholders tended to accept the solar energy emergence impact with relatively few attempts to 
provide alternative viewpoints or control. Dave Hallquist, CEO of VEC, when asked if the Co-op 
can control the third-party solar emergence states, 
“We’re going to try and compete with a community net-metering offering where we use 
utility-side solar.  Our philosophy is that we can build it a lot cheaper than they can.  Our 
data shows that less than one-third of our members have locations that are even ideal for 
that situation.  If we hit 11 or 12%, you know the market is declining for those roof top 
solar developers.  We think if we do a good community net metering offering, it’s a better 
deal than roof top solar because you don’t have to do solar panels on your roof or your 
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yard—you get all the benefits but you don’t have to worry about operational 
maintenance.  We could offer a better deal.” 
 
Both EU leaders interviewed at VEC and GMP displayed “Control” quadrant (confidence and 
assuredness) and “Create” quadrant attributes (openness and teachableness). Cameron (2006) 
describes this as “Teachable Confidence” leadership behavior. Teachable confidence is facing 
the unknown and continually moving forward so as to co-create a new reality (Cameron, 2006).  
 
This openness to change and entrepreneurial confidence was noticed in both interviews and 
emerged in the Leximancer CEO reports. The EUs recognize that their state is in a rare position 
with a 90% generation dependence on nuclear and hydro. This allows them to be forerunners in 
the renewable EU market with a low risk factor. They can manage a controlled experiment, 
whereas a state that has to retire fossil-fuel generation and replace it with renewables has a 
higher reliability risk factor. Vermont is losing revenue due to the emergence of third-party 
leasing and net-metering (NEM). VEC and GMP are demonstrating structural ambidexterity 
because they have sensed an opportunity to add electric services (community NEM, electric 
vehicles, and HVAC) that will supplement their lost net-metering revenues; they are seizing 
those opportunities through a “Teachable Confidence” leadership behavior in working with the 
VPUC. The next and final step for GMP is the reconfiguration of its business model to a service-
based customer model instead of a vertically integrated generation, transmission, distribution 
service model. 
IV.3.2 Vermont business model changes and OA 
One example of business model changes is when restricted sensemaking was seen in this year’s 
proposed RPS bill. VEC and GMP, jointly with the Department of Public Service (consumer 
advocate), proposed legislation that will allow the RPS to be credited for offsetting electric 
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transportation, heating and cooling. With some consumer advocate support, regulators and 
stakeholders are confident that this “behind the meter” advantage will be approved and should be 
included in their business model as an RPS credit for the EUs.  
 
EU leaders in Vermont have one of the most open net-metering policies in the country and 
believe that in the future, EUs will move away from the traditional vertically integrated utility 
model towards a more distributed, service-based model. VEC and GMP are positioning their 
business plan models to accomplish this goal. A few key stakeholders, VPUC, and legislators 
have engaged in private meetings with VEC and GMP leaders in which they are listening to the 
distributed, service-based model proposal. Sensing this new opportunity, seizing, and then 
reconfigure the organization to take advantage of the opportunity describes the three key 
capabilities in structural ambidexterity.  
 
The Leximancer 2009 CEO report shows that GMP and VEC were concerned about their future 
energy needs and if the transmission grid was not as important to their business model. The 
Leximancer 2013 CEO report shows that VEC and GMP were focused on regulatory issues, 
rates, and net-metering associated with solar energy. 
IV.3.3 Identified differing business model patterns of GMP (IOU) and VEC (Co-op) 
The controlled nature of restricted sensemaking produced a limited interpretation of the future 
and how the focus should be on improving through incremental change. This singular focus 
resulted not from VEC and GMP leaders working to integrate and synthesize multiple 
perspectives with stakeholders, but from a lack of alternatives and explanations on the dominant 
EU solution (i.e. distributed service-based business model). Although EU leaders in Vermont 
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may generally have broader understandings of some issues than do individual consumers and 
investors (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), their perspectives do not include the variety of 
perspectives that exist across a range of interested consumers and investors. However, the CEOs 
are willing to listen and learn. For example, in a group net-metering case, 500 kilowatt systems 
are being built and used for group net-metering where the developer may only have one or two 
big solar customers. EU leaders are requesting a limit to this type of community solar garden 
approach because it does not appear to benefit the community or the EU. VEC and GMP leaders 
are displaying humility, teachableness, confidence, and assuredness behaviors by considering a 
new EU business model and listening to multiple perspectives of residential and commercial 
consumers. For example, Robert Dostis, Green Mountain Power Director of Government Affairs, 
explains how they will recover lost revenue, 
“So the solar build out has begun in Vermont…Green Mountain will be at 15% solar by 
the end of 2016….The way our law is now, if our customers produce enough solar power, 
they can bring our billing down to zero… so the concern is that they are using the system 
in every form but they’re not paying towards it, and then the amount of revenue to the 
utility is declining… We have to bring in new revenues into our company to offset the 
revenues that are lost.  And that will happen in two ways—one is by electrification of 
both heating and transportation so we’ll see an increase in load, and the second is new 
products and services that we will be offering our customers that will bring new revenues 
into the company while at the same time reducing our customers overall expense—not 
only in the electric sector but also in the thermal sector and in the transportation sector.” 
 
The specific needs of VEC and GMP to reduce the solar impact produced a restricted 
sensemaking process describing a highly specific Control CVF behavior for action. In 2012, both 
EUs realized they were losing some of their consumers due to third-party roof-top leasing. The 
EUs in Vermont are mandated to pay 20 cents per kWh for net-metering when the current EU 
retail rates are 17 cents per kWh. Specifically, the EUs are losing market share and have to create 
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new business opportunities. Dave Hallquist, CEO for VEC, described the future like an 
entrepreneur by focusing on new change, 
“Solar leasing companies were out there badmouthing the utility seller—you know, 
saying that we’re not ready to make the change—so we successfully reversed that 
because we aggressively got out and started building community solar and started to 
market the concept…. So, we truly believe, and I’m speaking for Vermont, of course—I’m 
not sure where the rest of the nation is--but in Vermont our concept is that we think 
transmission is a bad investment—we think we’ve got to start focusing on distributive 
generation, and that is our focus.” 
 
VEC and GMP leaders, who are characterized by “Teachable Confidence” in this study, have 
more influence and create more value by integrating positive-opposite “Control” and “Create” 
behaviors as described by Cameron’s (2006) CVF quadrants. So how are VEC and GMP 
creating new value? Co-ops are building community solar gardens and staying involved with the 
latest battery storage technology, creating value for their members. The IOUs are using the state 
regulatory programs to procure power purchase agreements (PPA) with third-party utility-side 
solar owners and, as GMP says, creating new markets by developing an “Extreme Energy 
Makeover” program to serve more like a general contractor for home energy improvements. 
Converting consumers to a total electric plan (from natural gas) would supplement the lost 
revenue from roof-top solar. Specifically, both EU leaders are creating value by proposing a 
change or revision to the RPS with the backing of the Department of Public Service (consumer 
advocate) to allow credit for offsetting electric transportation, heating, and cooling installations. 
Dave Hallquist, VEC CEO, stated, 
“If we can take our 90% carbon free footprint and create incentives for our members to 
go out and put in air/heat pumps to convert to higher efficiency electric systems for their 
heating, and electric vehicles, we’re going to get credit for that. There is an opportunity 
to sell a hell of a lot more kilowatt hours by incorporating transportation, heating, and 
cooling into our portfolio.” 
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O’Reilly and Tushman (2007) point out that structural ambidexterity is focused on the 
organizational characteristics and competencies required to sense new opportunities and threats, 
seize upon them, and then reconfigure the organization to take advantage of the opportunities or 
counter the threats. 
 
Table 11 VEC Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
4 yrs. ago 
incentives were 
to take people 
off of electricity 
Residential 
roof-top 
handled by 
third-parties 
and is 
aggressive 
Excess net-
metering 
Pay retail, 
plus three 
cents for net-
metering 
Aggressive Net-
metering Law. 
Liberal group 
promoting 
aggregate net-
metering 
(community 
solar) 
Non-solar 
customers 
should not see 
rate increase 
because they 
are covering 
more of the 
standard costs 
If EU serves 
72% of the 
load then must 
take 72% of 
the power 
output of the 
Renewable 
Standard Offer 
projects 
371 
installations 
causing a 
cross-subsidy 
of about 
$587,000 
Three renewable 
programs direct 
EUs in how much 
renewable they 
have in their 
portfolio 
EU 
Control 
Solar 
opportunity with 
an open BOD 
Increased the 
peak demand 
cap to 15% and 
reserved 4% of 
for community 
net-metering  
Have to focus 
on distributive 
generation 
Create 
incentives to 
put in air/heat 
pumps and 
electric 
vehicles 
Proposal to allow 
RPS credit for 
offsetting 
transportation and 
heating and 
cooling 
Adding 
transportation 
and HVAC 
portfolio 
Solar customers 
should pay a 
tariff 
Converting to 
a distribution 
service model 
Solar 
customers 
should pay a 
tariff 
Solar customers 
should pay a tariff 
  
 
 
Table 12 GMP Interview Common Issues and Response 
 Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder Retail rate plus Net- Serves 72% of Net-metering Three different 
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Impact 4 – 5 cents 
depending on 
the size of the 
system 
metering 
causing 
declining 
revenue 
the State, must 
take 72% of 
the power 
output of the 
Renewable 
Standard Offer 
projects 
causing 
declining 
revenue 
renewable 
programs direct 
utilities in terms of 
how much 
renewable they 
have in their 
portfolio 
Net metering 
limit goes up 
to 500 kW 
Third-Party 
Leasing 
Excess net-
metering 
Retail rate plus 
4 – 5 cents 
depending on 
the system 
SPEED law 
(Sustainable 
Economic 
Enterprise & 
Development) 
EU 
Control 
Solar Gardens 
4% of load 
is from 
solar and 
will be 
15% by 
end of 
2016 
First IOU to 
go to 
Distribution 
service model 
Cost recovery 
through the 
rates (cap on 
ROE) 
Proposal with 
consumer 
advocate to allow 
RPS credit for 
offsetting 
transportation and 
heating & cooling 
Electrification 
of heating and 
vehicles 
Solar 
customer 
tariff 
Community 
Solar 
Electrification 
of heating & 
vehicles 
Regulatory 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 VEC Interview (Co
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-op #4 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 22 VEC 2009 CEO Report (Co
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-op #4 - Leximancer) 
Figure 23 VEC 2013 CEO Report (Co
 
The Leximancer analysis of VEC in 2009 
moving forward with the increas
potential to erode revenue. There was a growing concern that 
it could eventually impact the EU
significant shift in the EU business model. The concepts under study were more ce
solar and the regulatory component was highlighted. VEC had 
result of changing its behaviors toward residential customer service by 
and getting more involved with customer electricity needs in the home. In 2014, the interview 
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-op #4 - Leximancer) 
(Figure 22) reveals a concern for the transmission grid and its value 
e in customer-side solar. Third-party solar leasing 
if the solar PV disruptive technology take
’s residential market. In 2013, the Leximancer report 
moved into the “Create” CVF quadrant 
developing 
 
was increasing with the 
s root, 
(Figure 23) shows a 
ntral in the mapping around 
as a 
community solar projects 
(Figure 21) 
revealed that net-metering was still a concern
becoming a reality. In summary, the r
allowing VEC to build community solar facilities an
costly RPS projects and increasing revenue.
 
 
 
Figure 24 Green Mountain Interview (IOU #2 
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, but the transformation to a distribution service organization was 
egulatory relations appear to be strong with VEC
d customer energy services in the home 
  
- Leximancer)
, thereby effectively 
thereby reducing 
 
 
Figure 25 Green Mountain 2009 CEO 
Figure 26 Green Mountain 2013 CEO Report (IOU #2 
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Report (IOU #2 - Leximancer)
- Leximancer)
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The Leximancer analysis of GMP in 2009 reveals similar results to VEC in that there was a 
concern for the transmission grid and its value moving forward due to the increase in solar from 
customer-side rooftop installations. Rates were increasing in response to loss in revenue realized 
from net-metering, resulting in unfair cost-sharing for non-solar customers thus creating 
behavioral changes for the residential market. In 2013, it appears that GMP was concerned about 
the loss of revenue from net-metering and wanted to move their business model towards 
distribution services, but the process was slower than VEC. This slower process to change may 
be attributed to the size of the IOU and the fact that it is regulated by the VPUC. The GMP 
Leximancer mapping shows that revenue, customers, and rates are pointing to net-metering as 
still being a concern. In 2014, the interview data revealed that while solar concepts were 
becoming more prevalent, GMP was becoming more active by creating community solar gardens 
as well as new programs that encouraged the electrification of residential heating and promotion 
of electric charging stations for vehicles. From 2009 - 2014 VEC and GMP have made 
significant business model changes. The primary difference was a change in the value 
proposition for both companies. The popularity of customer-side rooftop solar, third-party 
leasing, and ownership encouraged EUs to create a new revenue model more focused on 
customer services. Vermont has one of the friendliest net-metering policies in the country and 
consumers are taking advantage. The EUs are installing community solar gardens to negate this 
lost revenue. Table 13 provides a regulatory overview of the present position of the federal and 
state credits available along with the RPS and net-metering status. 
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Table 13 Vermont Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE* 
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 of 
30% that expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016. 
2. State sales tax exemption for systems up to 250 kW. GMP performance-based (net-metering 
systems only) incentive of $0.06 credit per kWh in addition to the value of the net-metering for 500 
kW systems. 
3. Enacted legislation in 2009 that retail electricity providers must purchase electricity generated by 
eligible renewable energy facilities up to 2.2 MW through the Sustainably Priced Energy 
Enterprise Development (SPEED) Program via long-term contracts with fixed rates. RFP process 
caped the rates at avoided cost rate.  
4. Small-scale renewable energy incentive program that allows systems that generate 1,000 kW/year 
of DC capacity can receive up to $2,850. 
5. Do not have an RPS but there is an established renewable goal of 20% of electricity needs with 
SPEED by 2017, 75% renewable by 2032, and 90% by 2050. 
6. Net-Metering: 500 kW limit for all systems other than military (2.2 MW) and micro-CHP (20 kW). 
Aggregate capacity limit of 15% of utility’s peak demand (1996 peak minimum). Excess is 
credited to customer’s next bill at retail rate. Group meter aggregation allowed and 15 kW or less 
system follow an expedited permitting process. 
. 
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IV.4 Georgia and Carolinas - Southeast Region: Georgia Power Company (IOU), Georgia 
Electric Membership Corporation (Co-op), Duke Energy (IOU), Electric 
Cooperatives of South Carolina (Co-op), Santee Cooper (State-owned) 
IV.4.1 Restricted Sensemaking and Structural Ambidexterity 
In 2013, Georgia was ranked seventh in the U.S. with 91 MW of solar installed by Solar Energy 
Industries Association (SEIA). Georgia and South Carolina residential retail rates are 
approximately 11.5 cents per kWh. Georgia’s four existing nuclear reactor units accounted for 
27% of the state’s net electricity generation, coal accounted for 33%, natural gas for 34%, and 
renewable energy for 6%. Georgia ranked tenth in the nation in net electricity generation and 
eighth in retail sales of electricity. In 2015, Georgia has a new solar H.B. 874 that amends 
Georgia law to allow energy produced by solar panels to be factored into a lease or financing 
arrangement by consumers. This legislation applies only to solar installations for an individual 
home or business and limits solar production to the consumer’s energy needs. Georgia does not 
have a state mandated RPS or a voluntary renewable energy goal.  
 
In 2014, S.B. 1189 was approved in South Carolina mandating the creation of a voluntary 
Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Program and establishing new net-metering rules. The 
legislation allows participating utilities to recover costs connected to meeting a 2021 RPS target 
of 2% aggregate generation capacity from renewable energy sources. The bill also mandates that 
the PSC create a program to offer nonprofits easier access to renewable energy and to incentivize 
residential customers to become customer-generators by purchasing or leasing renewable 
generation equipment.  
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In Georgia and South Carolina restricted sensemaking was found in varying degrees within the 
five EUs that serve the two states. Each EU tended to await others’ interpretations of an issue, 
which typically came in response to some external trigger. Georgia Power Company (GPC) 
stated,  
“Waiting and watching other jurisdictions helped them learn a lot of things to do and not 
to do. Not being the first mover was beneficial because waiting a little longer until the 
solar costs came down allowed us to structure our solar market in a way that was 
beneficial for everybody, not just to those who install the solar but to the other customers 
who do not install roof-top solar.” 
 
Solar impact to the EU business plan processes was low, with a few stakeholders discussing the 
issue or seeking to offer their opinions. At the same time, some EU leaders made an attempt to 
organize ways of promoting their interpretations of solar issues and gather the views of their 
stakeholder groups in a systematic way at the regulatory level. The transfer from restricted SM 
form to fragmented SM enabled parties to interpret the solar energy situation and synthesize the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders, initiating the “Create” CVF dimension (Figure 45). 
Cameron (2006) describes this type of paradoxical leadership based on hope and vision found in 
the “Create” CVF quadrant and the behaviors of Reason and Practicality within the “Control” 
CVF quadrant. With the Southeast region having the lowest electric rates in the country, the EU 
leaders displayed both practical and visionary tendencies. Logical optimism and realistic 
enthusiasm describe leaders that have developed “Practical Vision” behaviors where they can 
see both the realities and practicalities of the present and the possibilities in the future.  
IV.4.2 Georgia and South Carolina business model changes and OA 
The CVF “Create” dimension describes a behavior of innovative change which results in hope 
and vision. The data shows that the EU leaders in the states of Georgia and South Carolina are 
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visionaries and have implemented practical vision by combining hope and optimism with reason 
and logic. This behavior triggers breakthrough thinking. For example, Georgia Power stated, 
“We don’t have an RPS here, we don’t have a renewable portfolio standard and we think 
that is absolutely the wrong way to go….We don’t have a goal, we don’t have a standard, 
we have no infringement on the Territorial Act…we’ve maintained our avoided cost 
methodologies, all of those things are very important to customers over the long term.”  
 
But GPC has implemented a new organizational structure to handle the solar workload and 
initiated an “Advanced Solar Initiative” program per requirements of their PSC approved IRP. 
GPC explained, 
“We have created a separate organization, and even within my organization there is a 
team specifically designated to do utility-side and a team specifically designated to do 
distributed generation (DG), because they are so different in dealing with a 4 or 5 KW on 
a residential customer’s house is way different than a 50 megawatt solar farm….We’ve 
had to change because we’ve gotten so much solar...190 megawatts of DG is bigger than 
almost every state out there….We project that our renewable percentage by 2020 is going 
to be somewhere around 2% on a capacity basis.” 
 
Cameron (2006) says that leaders who develop “Practical Vision” can see both the realities of 
the present and the possibilities in the imagined future. The behavioral trajectory from 2009 to 
2014 has been along a positive-opposite creative value framework where EU leaders were 
focused on incremental change in the “Control” dimension and a transformational new change in 
the “Create” dimension. During this four to five year period, EU leaders began by making little 
attempts to shape understandings of an appropriate solar perspective with stakeholders or 
influence how others saw a particular issue because the impact of solar energy was very 
restricted. But as the EU business model components became affected, behaviors changed and 
the impact of solar required a new value creation dimension.  
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The Leximancer 2009 CEO report shows that Georgia Power (IOU) and GEMC (Co-op) were 
concerned about the value proposition that renewable energy brought to the EU and the 
customer. The cost to meet the Federal emission reduction requirements appeared to be the main 
concept under review. In 2013, the focus was still on the EPA restrictions but the discussions 
were moving into the regulatory environment with the PSC. The impact to the infrastructure with 
fossil-fuel plant retirements and solar additions became more important. The 2014 interview 
results revealed business model shifts that were significant. Customer rates associated with solar 
build out and regulatory policies came to the forefront in the mapping. The net-metering leasing 
bill and the replacement of a dispatchable coal resource with a solar variable resource was 
discussed. In summary, the data shows that the EU business model is shifting toward a model 
dominated by the regulatory business model component. 
 
Duke Energy (IOU) and ECSC (Co-op) results were very similar to GPC and GEMC. This 
substantiates the grouping of these IOUs and Co-ops into a Southeast Regional category.  
IV.4.3 Identified differing business model patterns between IOUs and Co-ops 
Instances of restricted and then fragmented sensemaking led to positive-opposite behaviors to 
create value for consumers and investors. Initially, in 2009, stakeholders failed to offer 
spontaneous solutions to the solar issues, and as EU leaders neither encouraged them to do so nor 
put forward their own interpretations, SM in the restricted form produced only simple examples 
of impact. As a result, IOU and Co-op leaders focused on improving internal processes to 
increase efficiency. But as solar PV material costs decreased and regulatory pressures increased, 
EU leaders and stakeholders started to grasp the narratives of solar issues that might provide 
some basis for value creation. For example EU leaders and stakeholders, who struggled with the 
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issues initially, began to sense that they needed to work together to develop better solutions. 
They began to engage in sensegiving with respect to the issue and not avoid conflict as they had 
done a few years earlier. After years of uncertainty and procrastination in legislation, the IOU 
and Co-op leaders and the PSCs suggested flexible net-metering and leasing arrangements that 
would avoid judicatory procedures. The fragmented SM enabled the interpretation of the solar 
energy situation to take place with multiple stakeholders, initiating the “Create” CVF dimension. 
IOUs started demonstrating structural ambidexterity. The resource constraints and the lack of 
solar growth in the rural areas allowed Co-ops to absorb the workload with existing processes 
and procedures demonstrating contextual ambidexterity. As growth increases, the expectation is 
that the urban Co-ops will be the first to move from a contextual ambidextrous environment to a 
structural environment. 
 
When single explanations of impact become multiple narratives, communication transforms from 
the restricted SM to a more fragmented SM form of communication. These multiple narratives 
that served as a catalyst for change included a new cost benefit analysis through government 
subsidies, the “Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights” position that homeowners were taking on 
private property rights (owner’s exclusive authority to determine how private property is used), 
and manufacturing cost reductions for solar PV. The previous simple interpretation of the 
explanation of impact had produced very weak foundations and EUs developed a “Control” 
behavior that did not motivate change from anyone. The earlier simple accounts of impact acted 
as discursive resources for EU leaders as they attempted to respond to an issue (Weick, 1993) - 
doing little to foster either motivation (reasons for action) or imagination (insight).  
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In South Carolina, with new legislation allowing IOUs and Co-ops to recover solar incentives 
offered to homeowners and with the approval of third-party leasing of roof-top solar, Duke 
Energy was the first to implement change through incentive proposals. Duke Energy explains, 
“The net-metering, we’re going to require going forward, in South Carolina…is to put a 
second meter out there at our cost, or we’re going to call it a distributive energy resource 
cost and charge it through this budget that the General Assemble is giving us.…We’re 
going to get that interval data, in the most efficient way we can. So we’ve got to do 
sampling now of all the renewables…to really understand what benefits they’re bringing 
to the system, what are they drawing from us, when are they putting stuff out there, and in 
a way that our rates group does not currently do it. We are pushing change within the 
company in our rates group, in our metering group, in our IT group--that’s been our 
mandate, we must push for the change. South Carolina for us is a Petri dish, it’s the first 
state where we have a legislative mandate to revise net-metering, where we have a 
legislative mandate to provide customers with the price signals to adopt solar in a 
distributive generation fashion and a roof top fashion.” 
 
This decision demonstrates that Duke Energy has sensed an opportunity to recover their solar 
incentive costs and is seeking to understand the dynamics of the solar market in South Carolina 
with a Creative behavior. Georgia was soon to follow with its own Creative behavior through its 
regulatory business model. The proposed Georgia HB 874 amended current Georgia law to allow 
energy produced by solar electric generators to be factored into a lease or financing arrangement 
by consumers. GEMC (Co-op) explains the solar industry position,  
“The solar industry has become really aggressive in lots of different ways over the last 
four to five years in Georgia…” The solar lobby “…got smart and started hiring 
lobbyists that had success with conservative issues and shifted their messaging from an 
environmental message to a property rights message. They started going to the more 
conservative side of the Republican caucus, some might consider themselves to be “tea 
party.”  
 
The GEMC continues by explaining the proposed bill, 
 
 “In 2014, Representative Mike Dudgen proposed a leasing Bill; EUs …had a resounding 
message given to us that this issue is not going to go away. Wouldn’t it be better if the 
utilities sat down at the table and drafted the Bill with something you can live with and 
equally addresses your concerns, as opposed to just fighting this Bill year after year, 
because eventually you’re going to lose and you’re going to have to live with whatever 
that Bill is, so why not draft one yourselves…” 
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GPC and GEMC were heavily involved in this piece of legislation which is considered a win-win 
in that it fairly addresses the needs of both EUs and consumers. As stated earlier, “Practical 
Vision” has taken shape in both states with a bit of variability in timing between IOUs and Co-
ops based on available resources and solar growth rates. The realities of the present and the 
possibilities in the imagined future are transforming the EU leadership to an organizational 
ambidextrous form that makes sense. 
 
Table 14 GPC Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
735 MW 
Advanced Solar 
Initiative 
program for 
utility-side and 
customer-side 
Customers get 
into solar for 
environmental 
reasons, 
hedging, and 
rate security 
Unfair cost-
sharing 
Roof-top solar with 
one meter offsets 
their usage – lost 
revenue. 
Clean Power Plan 
(EPA) 
Bid out the 
DG market to 
lower payouts 
Solar is more 
dominant in 
the urban 
areas 
Solar variability 
and not able to 
dispatch 
Fossil-fuel plant 
closings will 
increase rates 
Leasing on customer-
side solar 
EU 
Control 
Two meter - 
Residential buy 
at retail rate, 
GPC buys at 
avoided cost. 
20 yr. contracts 
Still not cost 
effective to 
install roof-top 
solar 
New solar 
organization 
created to adapt 
to solar 
emergence 
100% fuel 
recovery, so it’s 
just a pass through 
and not in our base 
revenue 
requirements. 
Have a Public 
Service Commission 
that is supportive of 
renewables and solar 
in particular. 
 
Avoided cost 
for net-
metering 
Need to 
decouple 
residential 
rates 
Two meter - 
Residential buy 
at retail rate, 
GPC buys at 
avoided cost. 
20 yr. contracts 
The two meter 
solution: Customer 
buying at retail 
rate, GPC doesn’t 
lose revenue, no 
other customers are 
subsidizing. 
No RPS, no solar 
goals, no 
infringement on the 
Territorial Act, 
maintained the 
avoided cost 
methodologies 
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Table 15 GEMC Interview Common Issues and Response 
 
Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
GPC funding of a 
new unregulated 
division that 
markets and 
operates solar 
leasing will impact 
the Co-ops 
Customers get 
into solar for 
environmental 
reasons, 
hedging, and rate 
security 
Unfair cost-
sharing 
Roof-top solar 
with one meter 
offsets their usage 
– lost revenue. 
Clean Power 
Plan (EPA) 
Co-ops can get into 
the leasing 
business for 
customers in their 
territory. 
Solar bills that 
allow exceptions 
to the CUVA 
Covenants which 
is the 
Conservation 
Use Covenants 
(tax benefit) 
Excess net-
metering on 
circuits 
Fossil-fuel plant 
closings will 
increase rates 
Leasing bill for 
customer-side 
solar 
EU 
Control 
Co-ops considering 
the two meter 
design- Customer 
buys at retail rate, 
GEMC buys at 
avoided cost. 
Still not cost 
effective to 
install roof-top 
solar 
New solar 
absorbed within 
existing 
organization 
Net-metering 
aggregate limits 
Have a Public 
Service 
Commission 
that is 
supportive of 
renewables and 
solar in 
particular 
Avoided cost for 
net-metering 
Need to 
decouple 
residential rates 
Solar tariff to 
cover fixed 
costs. 
The two meter 
solution: 
Customer buying 
at retail rate, 
GEMC doesn’t 
lose revenue, no 
other customers 
are subsidizing. 
No RPS, no 
solar goals, no 
infringement on 
the Territorial 
Act, and 
maintained the 
avoided cost 
methodologies 
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Table 16 Duke Energy / Santee Cooper Interview Common Issues and Response 
 Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
IOUs must 
normalize the 
investment tax 
credit across the 
twenty year life 
Customers get 
into solar for 
environmental 
reasons, hedging, 
and rate security 
Unfair cost-
sharing 
Roof-top solar 
with one meter 
offsets their 
usage – lost 
revenue. 
Clean Power 
Plan (EPA) 
Solar is a threat 
because in a PPA 
we don’t own an 
asset or get a rate of 
return on it, and at 
some time a PPA is 
a debt on the 
balance sheet 
Leasing bill for 
customer-side 
solar 
Solar 
variability and 
not able to 
dispatch 
Fossil-fuel 
plant closings 
will increase 
rates 
Leasing bill for 
customer-side 
solar 
EU 
Control 
Two meter - 
Residential buy at 
retail rate, Duke 
buys at avoided 
cost. 20 yr. 
contracts 
Bill allows EUs 
to offer 
consumers 
choices, to adopt 
solar and buy it 
down. Does not 
disrupt our 
revenue model 
You decouple 
your rate from 
the solar such 
as you’re still 
meeting your 
earnings as a 
minimum 
requirement 
100% fuel 
recovery, so 
it’s just a pass 
through and 
not in our base 
revenue 
requirements. 
Bill allows cost 
recovery, a 
budget, and a 
directive from 
the General 
Assembly to 
offer incentives 
Avoided cost for 
net-metering 
There is a healthy 
debate within 
Duke Energy as 
to whether or not 
we should be in 
the roof-top 
business 
Solar tariff to 
cover fixed 
costs. 
Two meter 
solution: 
Customer 
buying at retail 
rate, Duke 
doesn’t lose 
revenue, no 
other 
customers are 
subsidizing. 
Adapt to the 
solar 
environment, 
operationally 
and staffing-
wise, and Co-
operate it and 
make it part of 
our business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 ECSC Interview Common Issues and Response 
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 Value 
Proposition 
Customer 
Interface 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Revenue 
 
Regulatory 
Stakeholder 
Impact 
Must file a new net 
metering tariff with 
the Public Service 
Commission tied to a 
methodology and 
system value. 
Customers get 
into solar for 
environmental 
reasons, 
hedging, and 
rate security 
Unfair cost-
sharing 
Roof-top solar 
with one meter 
offsets their 
usage – lost 
revenue. 
Clean Power 
Plan (EPA) 
will increase 
transmission 
rate 
Must file a 
Distributive Energy 
Resource Plan that 
sets cap on incentives 
for  solar with a 2% 
peak demand limit by 
2021 
Leasing bill for 
customer-side 
solar 
Co-ops do not 
own any 
generation 
in SC, they 
buy wholesale 
from Duke and 
Santee Cooper 
Fossil-fuel plant 
closings will 
increase rates 
Leasing bill 
for customer-
side solar 
EU 
Control 
Two meter - 
Residential buy at 
retail rate, Co-op 
buys at avoided cost. 
Co-ops are in the 
business of 
delivering value. 
One day what 
we’re going to 
sell will look 
like energy 
services or grid 
services 
Increase 
Distribution 
Services for 
the customers 
100% fuel 
recovery, so it’s 
just a pass 
through and not 
in our base 
revenue 
requirements. 
SC bill allows 
cost recovery, 
a budget, and 
a directive 
from 
the General 
Assembly to 
offer 
incentives 
Avoided cost for 
one-meter net-
metering 
Fixed monthly 
payment may be 
the future just 
like cell phones 
Solar tariff to 
cover fixed 
costs. 
Two meter 
solution: 
Customer 
buying at retail 
rate, Co-op 
doesn’t lose 
revenue, no 
other customers 
are subsidizing. 
New bill 
allows Co-ops 
adapt to the 
solar 
environment 
 
Figure 27
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 GPC Interview (IOU #3 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 28 GPC 2009 CEO/IRP Report (IOU #3 
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- Leximancer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 GPC 2013 CEO/IRP Report (IOU #3 
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Figure 30 GEMC 2009 CEO Report (Co
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-op #5 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 31 GEMC 2013 CEO Report (Co
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Figure 32 GEMC Interview (Co
 
91 
 
 
-Op #5 - Leximancer) 
 
Figure 33 Duke Energy Interview (IOU #4 
 
 
Figure 34 Duke Energy 2009 CEO Report (IOU #4 
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Figure 35 Duke Energy 2013 CEO Report (IOU #4 
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- Leximancer) 
Figure 36 ECSC Interview (Co
 
Figure 37 ECSC 2009 CEO Report (Co
  
 
94 
 
 
-op #6 - Leximancer) 
 
-op #6 - Leximancer) 
 
 
Figure 38  ECSC 2013 CEO Report (Co
Figure 39 Santee Cooper Interview (Leximancer)
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-op #6 - Leximancer) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40 Santee Cooper 2009 Report (Leximancer)
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Figure 41 Santee Cooper 2013 CEO Report (Leximancer)
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In summary, from 2009 - 2014, GPC/DUKE and GEMC/ECSC have made minimal business 
model changes. The primary change was that the IOUs moved to a structural ambidextrous frame 
within their corporations to manage the solar energy market. For Georgia and South Carolina, the 
popularity of customer-side rooftop solar third-party leasing and ownership may grow for 
residential and commercial entities upon legislation approval. The EUs are positioning 
themselves for change by controlling their existing processes and structures to prepare for the 
future. With the lowest rates in the U.S., the demand or need for solar PV is not as strong giving 
EUs more time to prepare. At present, the drivers for solar change in this region are the EPA 
Clean Power Plan and state regulatory pressures. The IOUs have changed more than the Co-ops 
by restructuring departmental resources, developing solar initiatives for utility-side solar 
additions, and agreeing to a solar leasing bill for customer-side roof-top customers. The primary 
growth of solar is in the urban areas which allow the Co-ops, who serve rural customers, time to 
align themselves to the initiatives that have been successful with GPC and Duke. Table 18 
provides an overview of the federal and state credits and RPS and net-metering status. 
Table 18 Georgia and South Carolina Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE* 
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 of 30% expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016. 
2. Net-Metering: All utilities must offer bidirectional or single directional metering to customer 
generators up to 10 kW for residential and 100 kW for commercial applications. The aggregate 
capacity limit is 0.2% of a utility’s peak demand from the previous year. The excess is credited 
at a predetermined rate. 
South Carolina: System Capacity Limit: 20 kW for residential; 1000 kW or 100% of demand 
for non-residential. Aggregate Capacity Limit: 2% of average retail peak demand for previous 
5 years. Net excess credited to customer's next monthly bill.  
V DISCUSSION 
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V.1.1 Effects of the EU Business Model and Competing Values Framework on OA 
The framing of the solar PV EU leader business model changes acts as an important guide to 
help determine EU organizational ambidexterity (OA). Specifically, this researcher continues the 
efforts of Richter (2011), Maitlis (2005), and Cameron (2006) by using theory elaboration to 
propose a new conceptualization for determining EU organizational ambidexterity in response to 
an emerging disruptive technology. Richter’s (2011) EU Business Model, Maitlis (2005) 
sensemaking forms, and Cameron’s (2006) Competing Value Leadership Framework are used in 
an integrated manner to determine the EU leadership behavior that affects OA decision making. 
This study uses at least 55 solar energy issue domains (five business model components x 11 
electric utilities) to differentiate between OA types. 
  
Examining the interviews, CEO reports, and IRP raw data in relation to this conceptualization 
leads to important findings for the first research question: How have EU business model changes 
and OA behaviors helped EUs respond to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a 
disruptive solar technology? 
 
A description of the CVF EU leadership behaviors derived from the sensemaking forms is 
necessary to reveal the extent of an EU’s organizational ambidexterity. These descriptions 
indicate the emergence of four different CVF leadership behavior types that were present in 
different regions of the U.S. and answer the first research question. Figures 42 through 45 
graphically illustrate the CVF behavioral framework for each EU region and corresponding 
organizational ambidexterity. 
In the Southeast region, EU leader behavior is restricted and in the CVF “Control” quadrant due 
to low stakeholder involvement and high EU leader control. However, the study shows that when 
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the regulatory business model component is active, stakeholder sensegiving explanations 
increase requiring EU leaders to move to the fragmented behavior which corresponds to the CVF 
“Create” quadrant that is highly explorative and engaged. One important aspect of the “Create” 
dimension is that when fragmented behaviors occur by EU leaders and stakeholders, structural 
OA is displayed to efficiently implement innovative and visionary regulatory policies that were 
approved by EUs and stakeholders thus benefitting both parties. For example, sensemaking 
improved from restricted to fragmented in the CVF “Create” quadrant in Georgia when 
consumers and state representatives presented a private property rights justification for rooftop 
solar leasing instead of the weaker environmental benefit perspective. EU leaders recognized that 
the focus on an individual’s private property rights had more judicial merit allowing a positive 
climate for change with stakeholders. The regulatory catalyst for EU leader positive-opposite 
behavior change can be described as utilizing “Practical Vision”. The integration of the 
“Control” and “Create” quadrants can be a key to effective structural ambidextrous leadership. 
Cameron (2006) points out that achieving “Practical Vision” is a product of combining optimism 
and reason with a byproduct of intuition and insight. Leaders with this behavior can see realties 
and practicalities as well as possibilities and prospects of the future. The integration of these two 
contradictory concepts reveals a behavior that was found within the EUs in the Southeastern 
region demonstrating structural ambidexterity for the IOUs and Co-ops within the urban areas. 
 
In the Northeast region, VEC and GMP leaders are also displaying restricted and fragmented 
sensemaking and together they are characterized by “Teachable Confidence”. Vermont 
stakeholders are actively incorporating renewables into the state’s portfolio and VEC (Co-op) 
and GMP (IOU) are not opposing this approach. EU leadership behaviors show attributes of the 
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CVF “Control” quadrant (confidence and assuredness) and the CVF “Create” quadrant (openness 
and teachableness). Teachable confidence is facing the unknown and continually moving 
forward so as to co-create a new reality. As GMP changes from a vertically integrated IOU 
model to a distributed service model, the EUs are accepting this change as a positive step toward 
an effective transformation. Vermont is one of the first states taking steps to move away from the 
traditional vertically integrated utility model and create a structural change towards a more 
distributed service-based model. The integration of these two contradictory concepts is a key 
behavior that can support effective structural ambidexterity. 
 
In the Midwest region, Colorado is similar to other states in that the regulatory environment is 
where solar issues are explained and actions are negotiated and resolved for solar PV. When EU 
leaders find a balance between having patience, support, and compassion for consumers and 
stakeholders and knowing when to challenge legislators, a contextual ambidextrous “Caring 
Confrontation” environment emerges. When a collaborative behavior exists and high levels of 
EU leader control correspond to rich explanations from the stakeholders, a guided sensemaking 
form exists in the CVF “Collaborate” quadrant. The OA behavior is highly explorative, 
supportive, and directive. The positive-opposite to this dimension is the CVF “Compete” 
quadrant and minimal sensemaking. In this regulatory environment, misunderstandings can 
create tension for both parties initiating a need for a balance between collaboration (Caring) and 
competition (Confrontation). This integration of positive-opposites, or paradoxical leadership 
behavior, establishes an EU leader that emphasizes the welfare of the state before personal 
interests but challenges stakeholders and employees to also live up to a high standard leader 
model. Cameron (2006) explains that people respond to leaders that ‘tell it like it is’, challenging 
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mediocrity while practicing kindness and compassion. The integration of paradoxical leadership 
behaviors reveals that the Colorado Co-ops have created a contextually ambidextrous 
organizational environment to manage the regulatory impact of solar PV. 
 
In the Pacific region, KIUC and HEI have increased their guided sensemaking from 2009 to 
2014. Sensemaking solar process characteristics reveal a “Collaborate” quadrant strategy. As 
Cameron (2006) explains, the prescription for organizational effectiveness in a complex, 
unpredictable, and threatening business environment with hyper-turbulence is a flexible, 
autonomous, self-governing workforce. KIUC and HEI also display the minimal sensemaking 
form when fast change is necessary. KIUC’s collaborative strategy to empower the existing 
power supply department to quickly develop a “Compete” strategy for third-party financing, 
construction, and ownership of utility-side solar while maintaining the existing operations and 
maintenance functions in-house reveal an “Autonomous Engagement” behavior and contextual 
ambidexterity. The integration of these two contradictory concepts was shown by Hawaii’s EUs 
creating a contextual ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways to 
create organizational value. 
V.1.2 Patterns that differ between IOUs and Co-ops (Refer to Table 19) 
The second important finding of this study answers the research question: What are the 
discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned 
(urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology? 
This finding concerns the interaction of Richter’s (2011) business model changes between two 
different EU organizational types and their ambidextrous behaviors. As each of the Competing 
Values Leadership Framework (CVF) dimensions are analyzed alongside the Richter’s (2011) 
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business model components, an emergence of either structural or contextual organizational 
ambidexterity develops within each EU. From this analysis, each EU type (Co-op and IOU) takes 
on a more specific form of organizational ambidexterity. 
 
This study finds that within the value proposition component, the majority of the IOUs are 
utilizing structural ambidexterity and Co-ops are using contextual ambidexterity. IOUs are using 
structural ambidexterity for a variety of reasons. First, the IOUs serve most of urban America 
where the majority of residential roof-top installations are occurring. The implications of solar 
requests such as permitting, advanced land purchasing, environmental surveys, interconnection 
studies, bidding contracts, design, record keeping, and stakeholder interaction create increased 
time demands that cannot be met with the existing organization as was noted in the interview 
with Georgia Power. Also, an investor-owned utility must coordinate and implement a PSC 
approved integrated resource plan within an allotted amount of time. Finally, IOUs own most of 
the fossil-fueled coal plants that are being affected by the EPA Clean Power Plan which requires 
them to shift to alternative generation resources like solar. These factors led IOUs to use 
structural ambidexterity. 
 
Alternatively, Co-ops are using contextual ambidexterity. They have restrictions on resources for 
solar and fewer of their customers are installing customer-side solar. Rural farmers and large 
agricultural areas cannot afford the upfront capital necessary to install solar. Some customers in 
rural areas have sold their land to third-party utility-side solar generation developers. The Co-ops 
are utilizing existing processes and procedures to manage limited solar installations 
demonstrating contextual ambidexterity. 
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Within the customer interface business model component, most of the IOUs utilize structural 
ambidexterity and Co-ops use contextual ambidexterity to handle the solar customer-side solar 
PV market. The Pacific region offers a different perspective which shows the need for structural 
ambidexterity with IOUs. In Hawaii, KIUC’s consumer retail rates have fallen significantly from 
34 cents per kWh to 21 cents per kWh due to the implementation of utility-side solar and bio-
mass plants supplanting the use of expensive oil-fired generation. Interview data in reference to 
highly controversial topics like roof-top solar indicates that KIUC maintained positive customer 
relations whereas HEI struggled with customer relations. Because IOUs serve more urban 
customers and have the added pressures from third-party solar leasing entities, they are impacted 
significantly from consumer friendly regulatory mandates like net-metering. HEI difficulty with 
customer relations is due to its back-log of roof-top customer requests that have not been 
processed due to operational issues and the significant presence of SolarCity pressuring 
policymakers to open up the market. It appears from the data that HEI should consider moving 
toward a structural framework like other large IOUs have done due to the extreme popularity of 
customer-side solar within their service territory. 
 
In reference to infrastructure, Co-ops and IOUs are using contextual ambidexterity to handle this 
business model component. The emergence of solar PV has had a significant impact on 
operations. IOUs are vertically integrated where they own generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems requiring a stricter reliance on operational issues. The increase of 
renewables on the grid has caused technical grid voltage and frequency reliability problems that 
must be studied and resolved. Additional grid upgrades to resolve these issues will increase retail 
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rates and exacerbate the solar cost-sharing arguments. Tri-State in Colorado states that their cross 
state postage stamp transmission rate structure does not take into account the additional RPS 
requirements in Colorado and causes them to overcharge other states for transmission services 
and undercharge Colorado. IOUs and Co-ops are also asking for approval to decouple retail rates 
into a fixed and a variable component to eliminate over charging non-solar customers and under-
charging solar customers. 
 
An unexpected finding is that VEC and GMP in Vermont are forerunners in the formation of a 
distributed service model that could reduce the reliance on the transmission grid. Third-party 
distribution solar gardens in Colorado and Vermont have changed the EU infrastructure business 
model component as specific customers are switching to solar array service. The general opinion 
of the EUs is that the EPA Clean Power Plan will force the retirement of older fossil-fueled 
power plants and incentivize the need for utility-side solar plants. This will increase the 
dependence on solar PV causing operational service issues and costs to increase. It is the belief 
of this author that the EUs will not sacrifice reliability by significantly increasing utility-side 
dependence on solar until they resolve these operational service issues. If the EPA Clean Power 
Plan is not amended to allow EUs more time to incorporate technical advances (smartgrid 
technology) to resolve the operational issues then solar PV growth will slow down on the utility-
side forcing EPA fines and EU costs to increase. In either EPA scenario the increased EU costs 
will be passed to the consumer which will create a consumer behavioral shift to install roof-top 
solar PV, as solar material costs continue to decrease. The best solution is for policy-makers and 
EUs to utilize guided sensemaking to develop a Collaborative / Competitive EU Competing 
Values Leadership (behavioral) Framework. This behavior will enhance and incorporate a 
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positive decision-making process that may include incentives and penalties as drivers for CO2 
EU reduction with realistic implementation milestones.  
 
In summary, the IOU and Co-ops are both using existing processes and procedures to plan their 
transmission grids. The use of contextual ambidexterity is appropriate in this system planning 
area until either the EPA Clean Power Plan regulations accentuate the need to retire fossil-fuel 
power plants and increase the solar PV resource percentage to a serious operational level or 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) requires excessive EU compliance 
mandates. 
 
In relation to revenue, structural ambidexterity dominates this business model component for 
both IOUs and Co-ops. The biggest difference between IOUs and Co-ops is found in relation to 
revenue. IOUs are regulated by the state PSCs and guaranteed a rate that will allow recovery of 
their costs through rate increases. The Co-ops do not have a guaranteed cost recovery mechanism 
and are concerned that the BOD representatives, who are their customers, may disallow 
additional costs for customer-side and utility-side solar. There continues to be internal EU 
discussions on whether EUs should take advantage of the solar leasing market and move toward 
a distribution service model. This business model component is the most volatile today in 
reference to loss of market share. It typically deals with issues like solar cost-sharing, decoupling 
of retail rates, and net-metering. IOUs and Co-ops have found that it is best to work together on 
these issues to improve the possibility of beneficial revenue legislation. 
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The regulatory model component was added because it is the foundation for the other four 
components of the business model. In the U. S. most Co-ops and IOUs have their own 
government relations departments to handle the lobbying and negotiations associated with 
controversial revenue business model topics. So, structural ambidexterity is used in this business 
model component. The regulatory component is the most active of all of the business model 
components in regard to the issues of impact and the actions associated with the control of solar 
PV within the EU environment. In 2009 most of the IOUs and Co-ops did not focus on solar PV 
because they had strong regulatory control mechanisms in place (i.e. Territorial Act Laws) that 
prevented residential consumers from leasing roof-top solar panels. However, the EU regulatory 
component became a key part of the business model as the EU industry experienced a 
transformation between 2009 and 2013 when federal and state government incentives were 
enacted, EPA CO2 reduction mandates were approved, solar PV costs decreased and state RPS 
mandates began.  
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Compete 
Figure 42 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Hawaii) 
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Figure 43 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Colorado) 
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Figure 44 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Vermont) 
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Figure 45 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Georgia) 
 
 
Table 19 Discernable patterns that differ and agree between a IOU and Co-op 
  Value Proposition Customer Interface Infrastructure Revenue Regulatory 
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Region Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control 
SE IOU 
Structural 
Ambidexterity 
CPP / 
Leasing 
Advanced 
Solar 
Initiative 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Investor Operational Reliability 
Separate 
Business 
Unit 
Low -  
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
ROI 
Regulated 
No RPS 
Control 
Create 
SE Co-op 
Contextual 
Ambidexterity 
CPP / 
Leasing 
Green 
Electricity 
Tariffs 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Board Operational Reliability 
Existing 
Resources 
Low -  
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
Need of 
Region 
Un-
regulated 
No RPS 
Control 
           
NE IOU 
Structural 
Ambidexterity 
3
rd
 Party 
Leasing 
Energy 
Service 
Provider, 
Solar 
Gardens 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Investor Operational Reliability 
Distributed 
Service 
Model 
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
Need of 
Region 
Regulated No RPS Create 
NE Co-op 
Structural 
Ambidexterity 
3
rd
 Party 
Leasing 
Energy 
Service 
Provider, 
Solar 
Gardens 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Board Operational Reliability 
Distributed 
Service 
Model 
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
Need of 
Region 
Un- 
Regulated 
No RPS 
Create 
           
Midwest IOU 
Structural 
Ambidexterity 
RPS,CPP 
Solar 
Gardens 
Utility-
Side PPA 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Investor Operational Reliability 
Separate 
Business 
Unit 
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
ROI 
Regulated RPS Collaborate 
Midwest 
Co-op 
Contextual 
Ambidexterity 
RPS,CPP 
Solar 
Gardens 
Utility-
Side PPA 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Board Operational Reliability 
Existing 
Resources 
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
Need of 
Region 
Partially 
Regulated 
RPS 
Collaborate 
           
Pacific IOU 
Contextual 
Ambidexterity 
Solar 
City 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side PPA 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Investor Operational Reliability 
Existing 
Resources 
NEM 
Leasing 
Utility-
Side 
ROI 
Regulated 
RPS 
Collaborate 
Compete 
Pacific Co-op 
Contextual 
Ambidexterity 
Lower 
Rates 
Utility-
Side 
Ownership 
Customer 
Environmental 
driven 
Board Operational Reliability 
Existing 
Resources 
Battery 
Storage 
NEM 
Utility-
Side 
Need of 
Island 
Partially 
Regulated 
RPS 
Collaborate 
Compete 
 
 
VI  CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
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This study makes three important contributions to the EU business model and to organizational 
ambidexterity literature. 
 
First, the study identifies, develops, and uses an integrative approach (tool) to assess business 
model strategies and business behavior within an electric utility during the emergence of a 
disruptive technology. Drawing on, extending, and organizing important ideas from the business 
model explanations and narratives through sensemaking allowed the business model components 
to be organized into four behavioral forms (guided, restricted, fragmented, and minimal). These 
forms were then integrated into the Competing Values Leadership Framework to investigate how 
electric utility leaders position their organizations to address the challenges of solar PV. This 
framework is a contribution to the area of concern. 
 
Second, the addition of a regulatory component to the EU business model was a contribution to 
the conceptual thinking of the business model framework during the emergence of a disruptive 
technology. It was added to Richter’s (2011) EU business model because within the U.S. there is 
a strong presence of the regulatory arm. Federal and state governments have enacted rules and 
defined responsibilities to ensure a clean environment. The regulatory model component 
improved the EU business model interpretations of the solar PV issues that impacted the EUs 
and stakeholders along with the actions to control market share. The emergence of solar PV 
technology, which is becoming a cost effective energy resource for individuals and EUs, has and 
will continue to disrupt the vertically integrated EU business model. The regulatory component 
contribution is a critical component to influence the EUs strategy and operational decision-
making. The differing issues and associated actions to mitigate the impact of solar emergence for 
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Co-ops and IOUs are resolved through the strong presence of the regulating side of the EU 
business model. Thus, the addition of a regulatory component to the EU business model is 
necessary. 
 
The third contribution is a predictive and prescriptive instrument that allows EUs an opportunity 
to assess what type of ambidextrous business behavior best aligns and adapts within their EU in 
the presence of a disruptive technology. Organizational ambidexterity can allow EUs to align and 
adapt to the presence of a solar PV disruptive technology. By integrating the evolving EU 
business model with the Competing Values Framework (CVF), a new lens is created allowing 
EU Co-op and IOU organizational ambidexterity schema to become visible. The contribution 
focuses on the process of collecting and using current EU issues, structural, and operational data 
(through an interview process) and longitudinal CEO report data, evaluating the processes of 
solar impact and organizational control (sensemaking), and then linking the commonalities to the 
Competing Values Leadership Framework to determine a leadership positive-opposite behavioral 
value predictive trajectory. This behavior or situational leadership style projects whether the 
organizations are using contextual or structural organizational ambidexterity. This process can be 
used to analyze the state of an EU and help determine a course of action. 
 
There are a number of limitations within this study. One consideration is that the sample size was 
small - 11 EUs throughout the U.S. were studied with 5 pilot interviews. These electric utilities 
represent a mix of IOU and Co-op leaders that were grouped in four U.S. regions (Southeast, 
Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific). This mix helped to examine and understand business model 
changes and determine how organizational ambidexterity differed nationally in the presence of a 
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disruptive technology. It is the belief of this author that sampling EUs within the 2013 top 10 
ranked annual solar PV capacity additions in the U.S. and understanding their business model 
behavioral changes in four distinct U.S. regions makes this research generalizable across other 
EUs nationally. Also, there is a possibility that the four forms of EU organizational behaviors 
identified here may not be an exhaustive description of the OA type or behavioral trajectories of 
all EUs. 
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VII IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has four important practical lessons: 
 
The first lesson stems from the realization that IOUs or Co-ops can learn from each other. These 
particular findings recognize that some EU leaders are “early adopters” and are ahead of the 
disruptive technology curve. EU leaders can learn from these findings and, through sensegiving 
communication with each other, can determine the Competing Values Framework that best fits 
their needed behavior. For example, Georgia Power mentioned that they waited and learned from 
the successes and failures of other organizations before they implemented their Advanced Solar 
Initiative. This study provides an integrated approach of a predictive (CVF behavioral trajectory) 
and prescriptive (integrative tool to assess business model strategies) schema necessary to 
interpret how an EU’s business model is changing and to what extent it is showing ambidextrous 
behaviors. This research also points to a type of core leadership behavior that is relevant to 
companies who are combating a disruptive technology like solar energy. For instance, guided 
and minimal sensemaking positive-opposite processes creating “Autonomous Engagement” 
behaviors may be particularly valuable in a high customer interface business model component 
situation that requires the development of rich, multifaceted narratives for ongoing and 
spontaneous actions, such as establishing or re-writing net-metering requirements or developing 
non-solar cost-sharing legislation. The cooperative KIUC on the island of Kauai in Hawaii has 
led the way in this type of leadership. Its EU leaders have empowered its employees to take a 
solar leadership position and reduce customer costs by half. They are truly the electric utility 
“petri dish” for customer interface. 
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The second practical lesson is that an EU should be open to change and have the entrepreneurial 
confidence to consider changing or modifying its business model if needed. Vermont has made 
that decision and is now a forerunner in the conversion from a vertically integrated EU to a 
distributed service organization. The EUs in Vermont are utilizing a “Teachable Confidence” in 
that their business model consists of a energy makeover consulting service to supplement lost 
revenue, the installation and operation of a community distributed PV garden system, as well as 
the promotion of electric vehicle charging stations. This distributed service business model is the 
first step towards a distributed generation market. Many EUs have not recognized the value 
proposition of this type of community service level technology for a profitable business plan. 
Standardization of processes and the aggregation of volume could make this a niche market 
worth pursuing. 
 
The third lesson is that the federal and state governments are focused on developing legislation 
to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel power plants, initiating the growth of renewable 
resources into the EU generation mix, and thereby reducing consumer costs by opening 
opportunities for third-party competition within the utility-side and customer-side solar market. 
Government has little regard for variable energy resource operational issues and believes that 
EUs will find technical solutions that will not increase customer rates. The legislation mandating 
emission controls for EUs will change the EU business model forcing more EUs out of both the 
generation market and the residential energy supply market. More cooperative EUs will likely 
become distributed service entities and IOUs will create wholesale generation companies (i.e. 
Southern Company subsidiary Southern Power) to compete with third-party utility-side solar and 
wind generation companies across the U.S. These changes will require EUs to create a future 
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through innovation, employee development, consistent incremental change, and attentiveness to 
the needs of the customer. A descriptive and predictive integrative approach allows EUs to 
assess their business model strategies and align and adapt their business behaviors to provide a 
cost effective and reliable electrical power system through the dimensions shown in the 
Competing Values Framework. The objective is to give EUs a behavioral alignment tool that is 
flexible enough to make position moves ahead of the external stakeholder pressures allowing 
EUs to develop organizational radar to stay ahead of the curve. 
 
The final lesson learned from this research is that there will be operational issues associated with 
variable energy resources like wind and solar as they become a part of the generation resource 
mix. These operational issues will be studied by planning engineers and costly projects will have 
to be incorporated into the transmission grid to relieve voltage and frequency constraints. Today, 
the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) has the authority to administer compliance 
standards on every corporation that generates, operates, and maintains an EU. If these standards 
are not met, fines may be executed on corporations. The enforcement of these compliance 
standards has increased workloads to excessive levels within EUs since 2007. The variable 
energy resource (VER) expansion will force NERC to develop stringent reliability standards to 
maintain the current level of reliability. This will increase costs and create additional facilities 
that would not have been built with generation resources that are not dependent on wind or solar. 
This additional cost will have to be absorbed by consumers or EUs. The hope and vision for the 
future is that as renewable generation increases, EUs can grow and adapt in a way that reduces 
consumer cost and is beneficial to their organizations and to the consumer. However, we know 
that more compliance will require additional cost to develop reliability standards, but through the 
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emergence of increased technology to resolve operational issues and collaborative behaviors 
between the EU industry and policymakers, any substantive disruptive technology can be 
incorporated into an EU business model. 
 
The future research will include further qualitative studies with second and third tier solar ranked 
states to help gain more insight and to confirm the behavioral results. Another area of future 
research concerns the integration of the Maitlis four sensemaking forms with the Competing 
Values Framework between organizational departments. For example, in departments where 
efficient organizational processes are critical there would be more instances of restricted and 
fewer instances of guided sensemaking. Changing the unit of analysis to the department could 
lead to determining the ambidextrous behaviors necessary to improve efficiencies between 
department efficiencies. In order to develop an understanding of organizational ambidexterity, 
researchers need to acknowledge the integrative prescriptive process through the examination of 
the sensemaking contextual forms most conducive to the Competing Values Framework. Finally, 
a quantitative study using the same set of EU leaders could be conducted to confirm the forms of 
OA in this study. 
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IX APPENDIX A: EU INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
The Role of Organizational Ambidexterity in Electric Utilities in Mitigating and Embracing Solar Photovoltaic 
Technology 
Interview Protocol 
 
Interview guidelines 
• At the beginning of the interview, the participant will be informed about the purpose of the study.  
• The oral consent of the participant will be sought before asking any questions. 
 
Electric Utility and Executive/Manager’s background 
1. What is your job title and how long have you held this position? 
2. How long has your company been in operation? 
3. Where is your company based? 
4. What is your service territory and annual demand? 
5. Is your company a Cooperative, Investor-Owned, or Municipal? 
6. Could you describe your renewable energy portfolio responsibilities? 
 
Electric Utility Solar Energy Business Model  
1. Could you describe your organization’s utility-side solar photovoltaic business model? What is your present 
utility-side solar PV capacity? 
2. Could you describe your organization’s customer-side solar photovoltaic business model? What is your present customer-side solar penetration? 
3. Could you outline the general process you go through when initiating an RFP to install utility-side solar 
options? 
4. Could you outline the general process you go through when contacted by a consumer looking to install solar 
options? 
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of solar energy for your electric utility? 
6. How have you organized internally to handle the utility-side and customer-side solar PV interconnection 
requests? 
7. How have you responded to the changing landscape in terms of your attitude, and actual organizational 
response? Is this question related to infrastructure? 
8. What are your future plans for handling these requests if they increase? 
 
Electric Utility’s Value Propositions  
1. Could you describe how the utility-side solar PV projects provide a value to your organization? 
2. Could you describe how the customer-side solar PV projects provide a value to your organization? 
3. How do you adapt and change to this new solar PV disruptive technology and still balance the exploitation of your existing resources with the exploration of new solar capabilities? 
4. Do you provide customized solutions or energy related services for your customers? If yes, please describe. 
 
Electric Utility’s Customer Interface  
1. How do you provide renewable energy to your customers with utility-side solar PV projects? How do you inform your customers about costs? 
2. Can you describe your community solar generation model and how your customers get involved? 
3. How do you establish a long-term customer relationship? 
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4. Can you describe your Net-Metering solar program for small, medium, and large applications? How do you inform your customers about costs? 
5. Can you explain why some electric utilities pay solar PV consumers the retail price and some pay the 
avoided energy cost for wholesale power? 
6. How do you receive community feedback for your business services? 
 
Electric Utility’s Infrastructure  
1. Can you describe how you have refined your business model framework to accept solar PV technology? 
2. Can you compare and contrast the differences of how an urban vs. rural electric utility might approach the 
changing landscape and growth of renewable solar fuel sources? 
3. What are your solar PV operational obstacles due to the variability of cloud cover and the complications of 
customer-side net metering pricing policies? 
 
Electric Utility’s Revenue Model  
1. Can you describe your revenue stream through the feed-in of renewable solar energy? 
2. Can you describe how the economies of scale from large utility-side projects provide tax credits, public 
support, and/or revenue? 
3. How do you handle the high transaction costs associated with Net-Metering, Community Solar, and utility-
side third-party solar arrays? 
4. Can you describe your customer-side energy efficiency programs, solar training services, and/or solar panel lease plans that might counteract lost revenue? 
5. How can you differentiate your solar energy services from other competitors like SolarCity? Explain your 
utility-side solar services and customer-side solar panel leasing program, if applicable. 
6. What is your opinion about the solar business trends and growth in your service territory in reference to lost 
revenue? 
 
Electric Utility’s Regulatory  
1. Can you describe how the changing regulatory environment will affect your solar PV utility-side and 
customer-side business model? 
2. Does your state have a RPS or state solar mandates? If so, please describe. 
3. What are the regulatory obstacles for your electric utility now and in the near future? 
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